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NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NO ACCESS WITHOUT: THE POOR
CHILD’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL CATCH-22
Lisa V. Martin*
Abstract
In the midst of the push for universal access to counsel in civil cases and the
increasing proportion of litigants who represent themselves, a critical barrier to
access to justice for children has been overlooked. Federal courts have created
a catch-22 for child litigants. Children cannot bring claims themselves, so
parents must bring the claims on their behalf. Federal courts refuse to allow
parents to pursue these claims pro se, stating that parents cannot provide
adequate legal representation. Yet, there is no right to counsel in civil cases,
and these same courts typically conclude the children’s cases do not warrant
appointment. As a result, federal courts routinely dismiss children’s claims for
lack of counsel in the name of protecting children’s interests, leaving some of
the most vulnerable patrons of the justice system without legal remedies. Thus,
by enforcing a “counsel mandate,” courts effectively exclude low-income
children and their parents from legal relief, contravening children’s
fundamental constitutional rights to court access, parents’ fundamental
constitutional rights and responsibilities toward their children, and democratic
norms. To cure this constitutionally questionable practice and protect the rights
and interests of child litigants, courts should permit children’s claims to proceed
and liberally exercise their discretion to appoint counsel to represent them.
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INTRODUCTION
Judges, judicial commentators, scholars, and social justice advocates
have long lamented the inequity of the lack of a legal right to counsel in
civil cases.1 Yet, while the proportion of litigants representing themselves
continues to increase2 and the push for universal access to counsel in civil
1. For examples of this, see generally George Biram, The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967); Earl Johnson, Jr., 50 Years of Gideon, 47 Years Working
Toward a “Civil Gideon,” 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 47 (2013); Jonathan
Lippman, Shifting the Landscape on Access to Justice, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1159 (2017).
2. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 741, 749–52 (2015) (reviewing recent research); see also Anna E. Carpenter, Active
Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647, 657 (2017) (“Today, a majority of
parties in [lower] courts have no legal representation in civil matters.”); Dan Gustafson et al., Pro
Se Litigation and the Costs of Access to Justice, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 32, 33 (2012) (“Due

2019]

NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NO ACCESS WITHOUT

833

cases gains momentum,3 a critical barrier to access to justice for children
has been overlooked. Federal courts have created a catch-22 for child
litigants.4 Children cannot bring claims themselves, so parents must bring
the claims on their behalf.5 Adult litigants can proceed with their own
cases pro se,6 but federal courts refuse to allow parents to pursue their
children’s claims without counsel, arguing that parents cannot provide
adequate legal representation.7 Yet, there is no right to counsel in civil
cases, and these same courts typically conclude that children’s cases do
not warrant appointment. 8 As a result, federal courts routinely dismiss
children’s claims for lack of counsel in the name of protecting children’s
interests, leaving some of the most vulnerable patrons of the justice
system without legal remedies.9
The case of Eric Duarte and his son illustrates the catch-22 that these
conflicting rules create for child litigants and their parents. In 2006, Mr.
Duarte filed a civil rights action on behalf of his son, Michael, against the
Santa Clara County police department.10 Mr. Duarte alleged that the
police used excessive force against Michael, a child, when officers
threatened Michael with a gun during a search of Mr. Duarte’s home.11
Mr. Duarte requested that the court exercise its discretion to appoint
counsel to assist him, arguing that appointment was justified because of
his inability to afford counsel, the complexity of the issues, his limited

to the high cost of legal services in litigation matters, many litigants appear pro se.”). These
findings are consistent with prior trends. See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts,
Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 478–
79 (2002).
3. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 112A,
at 2 (2006), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_
defendants/ls_sclaid_06A112A.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/767W-W6P4]; Laura K.
Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other Motivations Behind New Civil Right
to Counsel Laws, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1088–90 (2009); Tonya Brito et al., What We Know
and Need to Know About Civil Gideon, 67 S.C. L. REV. 223, 224 (2016); Russell Engler, The Twin
Imperatives of Providing Access to Justice and Establishing a Civil Gideon, 93 MASS. L. REV.
214, 214 (2010).
4. Although this Article focuses only on child litigants, this catch-22 also applies to adult
litigants who lack legal capacity for other reasons, such as disability or illness.
5. See infra Section I.A.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”).
7. See infra Section I.B.
8. See, e.g., Duarte v. Figueroa, No. C 05-1049 JF(PR), 2006 WL 708994, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 21, 2006).
9. See Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1990);
Duarte, 2006 WL 708994, at *1.
10. Duarte, 2006 WL 708994, at *1.
11. Id.
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legal knowledge, and the meritorious nature of the claims.12 The court
declined.13 Appointment of counsel was not warranted, the court held,
because the claims Mr. Duarte brought on Michael’s behalf were “not
complex at this stage” and Mr. Duarte had “aptly presented his [own]
claims” before the court.14 Without irony, the court then dismissed
Michael’s claims for lack of counsel, declaring: “[T]here is no apparent
reason why Plaintiff is the only individual that can bring this proceeding
on behalf of Michael.”15 The court did not suggest where Mr. Duarte
might find an individual who would stand ready to undertake litigation
on behalf of and finance attorney’s fees to benefit Mr. Duarte’s son.
Like adults, children have legal problems. Among other things,
children suffer discrimination and injuries from people and products, fail
to receive proper educational support, and are wrongfully denied
government benefits.16 Also like adults, children facing legal wrongs
sometimes need courts to resolve their disputes. But unlike adults,
children cannot independently submit their legal problems to courts.
Until they reach the age of majority or become emancipated, minor
children generally lack the legal capacity to pursue their own claims for
civil legal relief.17 Instead, an adult, usually a parent or guardian, must
initiate civil claims on a child’s behalf.18 During the past few decades,
parents who attempt to bring civil claims on behalf of their children in
federal courts have faced an additional directive: retain counsel or face
dismissal of the case.19
This practice, which this Article calls the “counsel mandate,” presents
lower-income child litigants and their parents with an impossible
paradox. To cure their incapacity and be recognized as legitimate parties
before the court, children must have an adult (usually a parent) advance
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 2011)
(challenging the denial of government benefits); Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir.
2010) (alleging false imprisonment, physical injuries stemming from the arrest, and a violation of
civil rights); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1991) (asserting claims
of “assault and battery, negligence, lack of informed consent, ‘wrongful discharge’ of confidential
information and invasion of privacy”); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906
F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1990) (contending racial discrimination).
17. See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
19. See Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986). Meeker was the first case
to announce the counsel mandate. The case has been cited by nearly 300 federal court opinions
applying the mandate since it was published. See Federal Cases Citing Meeker, WESTLAW EDGE,
https://www.westlaw.com [https://perma.cc/Q9MD-FWFK] (search 782 F.2d 153; then follow
the “Citing References” link; then select the “Cases” filter link; then click the “Jurisdiction”
expander, and check the “Federal” filter in the expander).
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their claims.20 But, courts often hold that the involvement of a parent or
another adult in the case places the child in a representational relationship
with the adult litigant.21 This representational relationship triggers the
mandate that counsel be retained because pro se litigants generally may
represent only their own interests, and not the interests of others.22 Courts
have no obligation to appoint counsel in civil matters, and they have
shown a general reluctance to do so, even when the court itself mandates
that counsel be retained.23
The counsel mandate is fraught with problems. First and foremost, the
counsel mandate contravenes fundamental principles of constitutional
law and democratic norms. Although readily imposed by federal courts,24
the mandate emerged with little supporting analysis that has been only
marginally further developed. Courts have utterly failed to consider how
the mandate intersects with parents’ and children’s constitutional rights.
Moreover, the severe shortage of free and low-cost legal services in the
United States means that the counsel mandate requires families to take on
the substantial financial cost of attorney fees as a prerequisite to court
access.25 For families living in poverty and those of moderate means, the
counsel mandate thus imposes an insurmountable financial barrier to civil
justice.
This Article is the first to evaluate the constitutional ramifications of
the counsel mandate for cases brought by parents on behalf of their
children.26 In brief, the counsel mandate violates children’s rights under
20. See Meeker, 782 F.2d at 154; infra Section I.A.
21. See, e.g., Myers v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); Cheung,
906 F.2d at 61; Pierson v. Allison, No. 1:08cv208–JMR, 2009 WL 3049220, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
Sept. 17, 2009).
22. See, e.g., Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2009); Cheung,
906 F.2d at 61; see also infra Section I.B (discussing the counsel mandate and introducing its
justifications).
23. See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 42, 54, and accompanying text.
25. See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2018),
http://legalaidresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/CIVIL-LEGAL-AID-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES2017-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZA6-M4S9]; see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE
JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS
19–21 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_
in_america_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/73AJ-LDCR] (noting that, in 2007, the ratio of free legal
aid attorneys to the estimated number of individuals living at “125 percent of poverty or lower”
results in only one attorney for 6,415 low-income individuals); infra Section II.A.1.a (explaining
further the impact of the counsel mandate on child litigants given the inaccessibility of counsel).
26. Other scholars have discussed the counsel mandate as providing doctrinal support for
other propositions. See generally, e.g., Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing
Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571 (1996) (discussing the
vulnerability of children and arguing this vulnerability does not justify the courts’ “paternalism
interpreted at the unreined discretion of judges”). None have critiqued the development or
implications of the mandate for child litigants and their parents.
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multiple provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes because it
excludes indigent children from federal courts and deters parents from
filing meritorious claims on their children’s behalf.27 The breadth of this
constitutional infirmity stems from courts’ imposition of the counsel
mandate without regard to either the nature of the child’s claim,28 or
whether the claim will expire during the child’s minority.29
The counsel mandate also infringes upon the constitutional rights of
parents.30 Supreme Court precedent dictates that parents are presumed to
act in their children’s best interests, and the government must generally
respect parents’ choices, even when imperfect.31 The counsel mandate
turns this deference on its head. By framing parents as would-be
“attorneys,” “representatives,” or “advocates” for child litigants, courts
justify the counsel mandate as a matter of courtroom procedure wholly
27. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 (1996) (noting the right to court access
encompasses equal protection and due process concerns); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB,
461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (“[T]he right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment
right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828
(1977) (recognizing court access as a fundamental right); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 429–30 (1963) (identifying expressive components of court access protected by the First
Amendment). See generally Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999) (identifying court
access as a component of the right to petition); Gary S. Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal
Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent’s Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56
IOWA L. REV. 223 (1970) (characterizing the right of access to the courts as both fundamental and
instrumental); Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J.
1055 (1973) (discussing due process, equal protection, and judicial access for indigents); William
L. Dick, Jr., Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of
Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627 (1989) (discussing due process, fundamental fairness,
and the liberty interests at stake in ensuring court access).
28. See infra Section II.A.
29. Id.
30. See infra Section II.B.
31. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (noting the Court’s recognition of
parental rights to make certain decisions); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)
(recognizing that parents have a “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and
management of their child”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence
historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course . . . .”); Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting that a host of Supreme Court
cases “have consistently acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter’” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 401, 403 (1923) (noting that a state prohibition of the teaching of “modern” languages
unconstitutionally infringed on parents’ liberty interest in controlling “the education of their
own”).
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within their discretion and ignore its implications for protected parental
authority.32 Recognizing parent litigants instead as parents—acting to
protect the interests of their children through the courts—reframes the
decision of whether to retain counsel as a parenting choice.33
The counsel mandate ignores parents’ liberty interests to the detriment
of children’s legal rights. By excluding their parents—the adults most
likely to have the motivation and wherewithal to pursue children’s legal
interests—from courts, the counsel mandate leaves children without
champions and without remedies.
Because it deprives children and parents of their fundamental
constitutional rights, the counsel mandate must be subject to strict
scrutiny. These rights, of course, are not absolute, but arguments
advanced in support of the mandate are insufficient and courts have failed
to conduct the searching inquiry of the mandates’ aims and success in
advancing them that heightened scrutiny requires.
This Article aims to compel courts to engage in that inquiry and,
consequently, to open the courthouse doors to children’s claims. It
proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the development of the counsel
mandate. It explores the mandate’s primary legal justifications and its
practical impact on children. Part II analyzes the contours of children’s
rights to court access and parents’ rights and responsibilities regarding
child-rearing. This Part concludes that the counsel mandate is
inconsistent with fundamental guarantees of court access and protected
parental decision-making as well as democratic norms of fairness and
equality. Part III argues that the counsel mandate should be eliminated.
Instead, the default rule should permit adult representatives to advance
children’s claims pro se, rather than consigning children’s claims to the
slow death of dismissal.
I. THE COUNSEL MANDATE
To elucidate the scope and underlying rationale of the counsel
mandate, this Section first explores how federal courts34 treat child parties
32. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991); see Cheung v.
Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990).
33. See infra Section II.B.2.
34. State court practices regarding whether parents must retain counsel to bring claims on
behalf of their children vary widely by state and by subject matter of the claim. The counsel
mandate has been applied by state courts in some civil matters. See, e.g., Yulin Li ex rel. Lee v.
Rizzo, 801 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Iowa 2011) (holding that “non-attorney parents’ representation of
their minor son or daughter constitutes the unauthorized practice of law”). In others, parents have
been permitted to represent their children pro se, including in juvenile delinquency proceedings
and in cases seeking restraining orders against abuse. See, e.g., Varner v. Holley, 854 A.2d 520,
524 (Pa. 2004) (vacating conviction of minor respondent for criminal contempt because the minor
appeared alone at the hearing; minor was not entitled to counsel but should have been
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to civil litigation, generally. This Section next evaluates the legal
justifications courts advance in support of the mandate, and, finally,
explores the impact of the mandate on child litigants.
A. Children as Parties to Federal Civil Litigation
Although children are entitled to many of the same legal rights and
protections as adults, they do not have the same ability to seek legal relief.
A defining feature of minority status is the lack of legal capacity.
Capacity is a party’s “satisfaction of a legal qualification, such as legal
age or soundness of mind, that determines one’s ability to sue or be
sued.”35 Minors generally lack the capacity to take civil legal action
independently; instead, they typically must advance legal claims through
an adult representative.36 As incapacity is a curable defect, capacity
doctrine presumes that cases involving child litigants can proceed and
establishes a basic framework for protecting minor litigants’ interests.37
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) governs the treatment of parties
who lack legal capacity, including minors and incompetent persons, in
federal courts.38 The Rule authorizes general guardians, committees, and

accompanied by his parent or guardian); Huff v. K.P., 302 N.W.2d 779, 783 (N.D. 1981) (finding
that father of 11-year-old may waive child’s right to counsel and appear for her “albeit rather
ineffectively”). Complicating this analysis are statutes that explicitly confer standing on parents
to bring claims on behalf of their children, and varying practices as to whether parents are
permitted to proceed pro se in such cases. Compare Goodwin v. Hobza, 762 N.W.2d 623, 627
(Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (noting father was statutorily authorized to bring tort claim on behalf of
child but not permitted to do so pro se), with Anderson v. McGuffey ex rel. McGuffey, 746 So.2d
1257, 1258 (Fl. App. 2001) (overturning restraining order obtained by father pro se on behalf of
daughter because of failure to meet legal standard for injunction). See generally Lisa V. Martin,
Restraining Forced Marriage, 18 NEV. L. J. 919, 964–65, 1000 (2018) (summarizing state laws
designating the adults who qualify to seek restraining orders on behalf of minors); Lisa V. Martin,
What’s Love Got to Do with It: Securing Access to Justice for Teens, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457,
475–76, 484–85 (2012) (same). As a result of these myriad factors, this article evaluates the
mandate only in the context of federal litigation. Nonetheless, the application of the mandate in
state courts implicates equivalent concerns to those that this Article identifies.
35. Capacity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
36. See 2 THOMAS A. JACOBS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 11:13
(2018) (discussing the general rule that unemancipated minors generally lack the capacity to sue);
4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.21[3][a] & n.16 (3d ed. 2018);
see also Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27
PACE L. REV. 869, 878–79 (2007) (providing a historical overview of children’s legal rights).
37. See Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1183–84 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
38. FED R. CIV. P. 17(c). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never interpreted or applied
Rule 17(c). Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2004). A number of states have
adopted the rule verbatim. See Sara Jeruss, Empty Promises? How State Procedural Rules Block
LGBT Minors from Vindicating Their Substantive Rights, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 853, 872–73, 910–33
tbl.2 (2009) (detailing the laws and court rules addressing minors’ legal capacity in the fifty states
and noting that nearly all states have incorporated Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
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conservators to sue and defend on behalf of children,39 and, where
children lack appointed representatives, the Rule empowers courts to
appoint other adults to represent children as next friends or guardians ad
litem.40 These adult representatives stand in the shoes of minor parties
and advance the child’s interests in the litigation. Thus, the participation
of a qualifying adult on behalf of a child in legal proceedings cures the
child’s incapacity and permits the case to proceed.
Although necessary to satisfy capacity doctrine, federal courts have
concluded that the participation of an adult representative (usually a
parent) in a child’s case triggers an additional procedural hurdle that must
be overcome before the case can proceed: such parents (or other adults)
must retain counsel to represent the child or face dismissal of the case.41
B. The Counsel Mandate’s Legal Justifications
Federal courts faced with pro se parents bringing civil claims on
behalf of their minor children have presented a largely unified response,
directing such parents to retain counsel or face dismissal of the case.42
Courts have applied the counsel mandate to parent-child claims across a
wide spectrum of cases, including cases seeking redress under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for civil rights violations by local government officials, cases
asserting disability rights (under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)43 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)),44 and cases seeking government benefits, debt collection,
products liability, bankruptcy, and tort remedies.45
Procedure into their statutes or have a similar rule requiring that a guardian or next friend appear
on behalf of minors).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(2). Because such adults make important decisions on behalf of the
child in a case, their interests must not conflict with the child’s. See M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d
170, 176 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Parents should not be appointed to act as guardians ad litem in litigation
challenging a grant of parental veto power.”).
41. See infra Section I.B.
42. See Myers v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005); Shepherd v.
Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002); Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1147, 1149
(7th Cir. 2001); Devine v. Indian River Cty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 1997),
abrogated by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Johns
v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937
F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir. 1991); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d
59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986).
43. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 (1990).
44. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
45. A random review of 523 federal cases in which the counsel mandate was imposed
revealed that the cases involved the following underlying legal claims: 64% civil rights, 15%
disability rights under the IDEA and/or the ADA, 9% torts, and 4% SSI. Additional cases
presented claims to enforce tax liens, fair debt collection practices, insurance, and bankruptcy. A
table of 523 cases in which the counsel mandate was imposed is on file with the author.
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Taken together, court opinions justify the counsel mandate as
necessary to preserve the traditional prohibition against nonlawyer
representation (and the underlying policies it advances) and protect child
litigants’ interests.46 Although this prohibition has long been applied in
other contexts,47 its application to suits brought by parents on behalf of
children has a relatively recent genesis and has proceeded without
extensive legal analysis.
1. The Weak Foundation of Meeker v. Kercher
In what is apparently the first circuit court opinion to consider the
question, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit summarily held
in Meeker v. Kercher48 that “a minor child cannot bring suit through a
parent acting as next friend if the parent is not represented by an
attorney.”49 In support of its groundbreaking holding, the Meeker court
cited only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) and the Judiciary Act
without further analysis; the court cited no prior precedent in support of
the rule.50 The court’s failure to explain its derivation of the rule from
these authorities is notable because neither authority directly addresses
the issue. The Judiciary Act says nothing about children,51 and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) says nothing about lawyers.52 Subsequent
circuit court opinions have somewhat further developed the mandate’s
analytical foundation, but have failed to account for constitutional
concerns.53 Notably, despite its weak analytical foundation, federal courts
have applied the counsel mandate hundreds of times since it was first
announced in Meeker.54
46. See, e.g., Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The
rule is primarily based on protection of the legal interests of the minor and the impropriety of a
person who is not a member of the bar representing another person in court proceedings.”).
47. See, e.g., Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(stating that a prisoner may not bring a class action pro se to litigate the interests of other
prisoners).
48. 782 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1986).
49. Id. at 154.
50. Id.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
53. Myers, 418 F.3d at 401; Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 970; Navin, 270 F.3d at 1149; Devine,
121 F.3d at 581; Johns, 114 F.3d at 877; Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 882–83; Cheung, 906 F.2d at
61.
54. A table of 523 cases in which the counsel mandate was imposed is on file with the
author. Several circuit court opinions each have been cited more than two hundred times for the
proposition that parents are prohibited from advancing their children’s claims pro se. Shepherd v.
Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 963 (6th Cir. 2002) (Westlaw’s HN 15 is cited by 223 cases as of Dec.
28, 2018); Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 874 (9th Cir. 1997) (Westlaw’s HN 5 is
cited by 284 cases as of Dec. 28, 2018); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 876 (3d
Cir. 1991) (Westlaw’s HN 7 is cited by 210 cases as of Dec. 28, 2018); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra
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2. Traditional Prohibitions Against Nonlawyer Representation
Courts point to the traditional prohibition against the practice of law
before the courts by nonlawyers as a principal justification for the counsel
mandate.55 Courts identify three sources of legal authority for this
traditional rule, but they disagree on how (and whether) each of those
sources impacts the question of whether a parent may bring a civil claim
pro se on behalf of a child.56
a. Common Law Doctrine
Courts frequently justify the counsel mandate as an exercise of their
authority to supervise the administration of justice and consistent with
general prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law.57 Federal courts
have inherent powers to control the litigants and attorneys appearing
before them. These powers are not conferred or shaped by statute, but are
implied by the creation of the courts themselves, and courts’ resultant
need to “manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.”58 The powers include the authority to
“impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission
to their lawful mandates,”59 establish procedural rules in the absence of

Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 59 (2d Cir. 1990) (Westlaw’s HN 1 is cited by 273 cases as
of Dec. 28, 2018); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 153 (10th Cir. 1986) (Westlaw’s HN 1 is
cited by 210 cases as of Dec. 28, 2018).
55. See, e.g., Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010) (“One consequence of the
normal rule is that a next friend may not, without the assistance of counsel, bring suit on behalf
of a minor party.”); Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 756
(6th Cir. 2005) (“That a non-lawyer may not represent another person in court is a venerable
common law rule based on the strong state interest in regulating the practice of law.” (quoting
Heldt v. Nicholson, No. 99–2120, 2000 WL 1176879 at *1 (6th Cir. Aug.10, 2000))), abrogated
by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 519 (2007).
56. See, e.g., Beard ex rel. Ford v. Hawkins, No. 14-13465, 2015 WL 3915877, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. June 25, 2015) (“It is true that non-attorney parents may not represent the interests of their
children pro se in federal court. But this is not a Constitutional rule. Nor, unlike subject matter
jurisdiction, is it ‘ironclad.’ Indeed, in certain situations, the ‘general rule’ does not even
apply. Instead, the rule is an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states, ‘In all courts of the
United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.’ It has
also been referred to as a ‘venerable common law rule.’ Its violation ‘does not require [the court]
to dismiss . . . for lack of jurisdiction.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Elustra, 595 F.3d at 705;
then quoting Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2011); then quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1654; and then quoting Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 756, abrogated by Winkelman, 550
U.S. 516)).
57. See, e.g., Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 171–72 (E.D. Va.
1994).
58. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962).
59. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
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statutory directives,60 and “control admission to its bar and to discipline
attorneys who appear before [them].”61
Court regulation of the practice of law seeks to protect the interests of
litigants and the administration of justice by permitting only those who
have adequate training and knowledge to represent litigants’ legal
interests before the court.62 “Unauthorized practice of law” (UPL)
doctrine generally prohibits those who are not authorized to practice law
in the jurisdiction from representing another’s interests before the court.63
The doctrine thus dictates that litigants represent their own interests or
retain licensed counsel to do so.
Because nonlawyer parents represent their children’s interests, rather
than their own, courts repeatedly have concluded that the parents engage
in the unauthorized practice of law if they advance their children’s claims
without counsel.64 Courts give several reasons for applying UPL doctrine
to such parents, which align with those justifying courts’ regulation of the
practice of law in general. First, courts fear that permitting nonlawyer
parents to act as lawyers would create a slippery slope and risk
undermining the courts’ control over litigation more broadly.65 Courts
cite the need to “jealously guard[] the judiciary’s authority to govern
those who practice in its courtrooms.”66 Second, courts are concerned that
permitting non-attorney parents to bring claims invites abuse of the court
process and unscrupulous conduct.67 Furthermore, courts worry that nonattorney parents’ lack of expertise will make them ineffective advocates,
causing children’s otherwise viable legal claims to fail68 and creating
60. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1825).
61. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
62. See U.S. PolyCon Corp. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 11, 14 (1999); Gallo v. United
States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 446, 447 (E.D. Va. 2004). In courts’ view, litigation advanced by
nonlawyers creates “unusual burdens,” as lay-litigants may advance the proceedings in an
inefficient and awkward manner, and risks unscrupulous conduct by nonlawyer representatives,
who are not bound by the ethical obligations of candor and of not advancing meritless and
vexatious claims. Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983); accord
Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 1986).
63. See generally Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law:
An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581 (1999) (examining
the legal and ethical issues with using a nonlawyer for legal issues).
64. See, e.g., Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir.
1990).
65. See, e.g., Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010).
66. Id. (quoting Myers v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005)).
67. See, e.g., Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61; Rosario ex rel. Rosario v. Apfel, No.
96CIV.1227(PKL)(SEG), 1998 WL 685173, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
68. See Devine v. Indian River Cty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating
that the rule against parents bringing pro se actions on behalf of children exists “because it helps
to ensure that children . . . are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents”),
abrogated by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
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significant administrative burdens for the opposing party and the court.69
Finally, courts view the application of UPL doctrine to parent-child
claims as a matter of fairness,70 as UPL doctrine requires the retention of
counsel for other litigants that require a representative litigant to advance
their claims, such as estates, corporations, and partnerships.71
Because courts’ inherent powers rest fully within courts’ discretion,
courts are empowered to make exceptions to the general rules of UPL
doctrine.72 In practice, such exceptions are rare. In the context of parties
that require a litigant representative, courts have granted exceptions to
support a few objectives. First, courts have permitted nonlawyers to
advance claims as litigant representatives where the interests of such
representatives and parties are closely aligned.73 Second, in limited
circumstances, courts have permitted litigant representatives to proceed
69. Gallo v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 446, 447 (E.D. Va. 2004); Rosario, 1998 WL
685173, at *1 (“Additional reasons that a non-attorney cannot pursue actions for another person
are the burdens the non-attorney creates for the opposing party and the court . . . .”); Brown v.
Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 171–72 (E.D. Va. 1994) (“Regulation that excludes
non-lawyers from representing others reflects that the conduct of litigation by a nonlawyer creates
unusual burdens not only for the party he represents, but also for his adversaries and the court.”).
70. See, e.g., Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[The
father] is not, however, a lawyer, and his lack of legal experience has nearly cost his children the
chance ever to have any of their claims heard.”); Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61.
71. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 830 (1824) (“A
corporation . . . can appear only by attorney, while a natural person may appear for himself.”);
U.S. ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008) (ruling that private litigants
may not bring False Claim Act qui tam actions on behalf of the United States pro se); Shepherd
v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that an estate executor may not bring a
claim pro se on behalf of an estate with beneficiaries other than the executor); Iannaccone v. Law,
142 F.3d 553, 558–60 (2d. Cir. 1998) (ruling that an executor may not proceed pro se on behalf
of an estate that has multiple beneficiaries); Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305,
1310 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a general partner may not bring claims on behalf of a partnership
pro se); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985); Capital Grp.,
Inc. v. Gaston & Snow, 768 F. Supp. 264, 265 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
72. See In re Holliday’s Tax Servs., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(“Modifying the absolute rule of corporate representation in bankruptcy cases, rather, rests on the
inherent power of a court to supervise the proper administration of justice.”), aff’d sub nom.
Holliday’s Tax Servs., Inc. v. Hauptman, 614 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1979); Turner v. Am. Bar Ass’n,
407 F. Supp. 451, 478 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (“In appropriate circumstances, a Federal Judge may, of
course, allow a defendant to proceed with a lay assistant or to orally assist his licensed counsel in
the presentation of his case . . . . This is so because of the inherent power lodged in a Federal
Judge to govern and control the conduct of the trial before him.”); cf. United States v.
Stockheimer, 385 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (permitting a disbarred attorney to
represent a criminal defendant at the defendant’s request as an exercise of judicial discretion),
aff’d, 534 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1976).
73. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Viking Food Serv., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 6837
(LMM), 1994 WL 702042, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1994) (allowing sole proprietors of
insolvent former corporation to proceed pro se where the individuals were also parties to the
action); Holliday’s, 417 F. Supp. at 183 (permitting sole shareholder to advance the claims of the
corporation pro se).
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pro se where the party could not afford to pay attorney fees.74 Finally, and
further to this end, courts have permitted a representative to proceed pro
se where requiring the retention of counsel would effectively exclude the
party from the courts.75
Each of these three rationales for creating exceptions to the counsel
mandate would seem to apply frequently to parent-child claims. Yet, in
the parent-child context, courts have created only one primary exception
to UPL doctrine for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) appeals.76 In
these cases, parents seek federal district court review of decisions by
administrative law judges regarding children’s eligibility for SSI benefits
or the amount of benefits they should receive.77 Cases permitting parents
to advance their children’s SSI claims pro se in this context note the
uniquely limited scope of SSI proceedings at the district court level,
which “essentially involve the review of an administrative record.”78
Such courts further cite all of the principles that have supported the
generation of other exceptions to the general rule. First, courts note that
parents in SSI cases have personal interests at stake that are united with
those of their children—namely, the interest in securing financial support
to pay for the child’s care.79 In addition, courts note that the litigation

74. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Marder, No. 92CIV.6878 (PKL) (NRB), 1995 WL 702377, at *2–
3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1995) (giving defendant corporation opportunity to prove it could not afford
counsel fees and indicating willingness to permit defendant to proceed without counsel if proof
provided); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 1994 WL 702042 (LMM), at *1–2 (permitting individual
defendant/third party plaintiffs to proceed pro se on behalf of their former corporation, in part,
because of their “severe financial hardship”); Holliday’s, 417 F. Supp. at 183–84; In re MSD
Woodworking Co., 132 B.R. 631, 632 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1991) (permitting president to advance the
bankruptcy claim of closely held corporation without counsel).
75. See, e.g., Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2010) (permitting a motion
to set aside judgment filed pro se by a parent on behalf of a child to proceed, in part, because, as
time for filing had passed, dismissing the motion would deny the child the opportunity to move
to set aside the judgment altogether).
76. One court formulated this exception as a broader common law rule that “if a district
court, after an ‘appropriate inquiry [into] the particular circumstances of the matter at hand,’
determines that the non-attorney parent has a ‘significant stake in the outcome of the litigation,’
a parent may bring an action in federal court on behalf of their child without an attorney.” Thomas
ex rel N.T. v. Astrue, 674 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Machadio v. Apfel, 276
F.3d 103, 107 (2d 2002)). Some courts have further required that parents seeking to advance their
children’s SSI claims pro se “meet basic standards of competence.” Machadio, 276 F.3d at 107
(2d. Cir. 2002); accord Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2011).
77. Understanding Supplemental Security Income Appeals Process—2018 Edition, SOC.
SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-appeals-ussi.htm [https://perma.cc/3NZR-3Z7Q].
78. Harris ex rel. Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000).
79. See, e.g., Machadio, 276 F.3d at 106; Harris, 209 F.3d at 416 (“As Dominisha’s
custodial parent, Harris is responsible for expenses associated with the minor’s maintenance.
Should Dominisha be found disabled within the meaning of § 1382c, Harris likely would serve as
the representative payee of SSI benefits. As a representative payee, Harris could use the SSI
payments for Dominisha’s ‘current maintenance.’ Absent SSI benefits, however, Harris must pay
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impacts the interests of no one other than the parent and child plaintiff.80
Moreover, given the eligibility criteria for and nature of SSI benefits,
courts recognize that the parent and child necessarily are living in
poverty81 and that children’s rights to the benefits “must be vindicated in
a timely manner,” as “child SSI benefits are intended to aid disabled
children while they are children.”82 Finally, and relatedly, courts express
concern that imposing the counsel mandate in SSI appeals cases would
“destroy” the child’s statutory right to judicial review,83 both because of
the challenges of timeliness and poverty and because of the dearth of
available counsel.84 These rationales for creating an exception to the
counsel mandate for parent-child SSI claims seem to apply broadly to
parent-child claims, but courts refuse to apply these rationales
consistently, artificially constraining the scope of the exception.
b. The Judiciary Act and the Right to Self-Representation
In addition to inherent powers, courts have cited the Judiciary and
Judicial Procedure Act (Judiciary Act)85 as a source of authority relevant
to the counsel mandate.86 The Judiciary Act guarantees to litigants the
right to self-representation in federal courts.87
for such expenses. Harris obviously has a personal financial stake in the present action.”
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.640 (2019))).
80. See, e.g., Machadio, 276 F.3d at 106 (contrasting the case with Iannaccone v. Law, 142
F.3d 553, 559 (2d. Cir. 1998), in which an executor was prohibited from representing an estate
pro se because the outcome of the litigation impacted beneficiaries and possible creditors other
than the executor).
81. See Adams, 659 F.3d at 1300–01; Maldonado ex rel. Maldonado v. Apfel, 55 F. Supp.
2d 296, 303 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
82. Maldonado, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
83. Id. at 303 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants the right to appeal a final decision of
the Social Security Administration (SSA) by commencing a civil action within 60 days of the
issuance of the decision and that a minor child “usually cannot exercise that right except through
a parent or guardian”); accord Adams, 659 F.3d at 1301; Harris, 209 F.3d at 417 (stating that
requiring retention of counsel by parents in SSI cases “would jeopardize seriously the child’s
statutory right to judicial review”).
84. Maldonado, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
85. Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1–5001
(2012)).
86. See, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (“[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”). The Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel also encompasses the right to selfrepresentation in the criminal context, extending its application to state court criminal
proceedings. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816–20 (1975). The Court cited the longstanding
recognition of the right to self-representation under English common law as well as its widespread
support in the early colonies as evidence that the Framers did not intend for the right to assistance
of counsel to supersede the right of a defendant to decline counsel and represent him or herself.
See id. at 821–32.
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Courts’ understanding of how the Judiciary Act implicates the
question of whether parents can advance their children’s claims pro se
varies widely.88 Courts advance four distinct interpretations of the
Judiciary Act that are relevant to this analysis.
First, some courts hold that the Judiciary Act’s guarantee of the right
to self-representation does not apply to child litigants. Such courts reason
that the right to self-representation aims to respect autonomy by reserving
to the individual litigant the choice of whether to present one’s claims
through counsel or oneself.89 Indeed, the right emerged as a bulwark
against the abuses of the English Star Chamber, in which individuals were
forced to be represented by state counsel in politically motivated trials.90
Thus, the freedom to state one’s own case constitutes a defense against
government oppression in state-initiated proceedings, as well as a
guarantee of individual dignity and autonomy, ensuring that the
individual can present her case as she sees fit.91 Courts interpreting the

88. The Supreme Court has addressed this issue in dicta but has never ruled on this question.
In a case deciding a different question (whether an artificial entity could be considered a “person”
and thus eligible to seek in forma pauperis status) the Court noted that “save in a few aberrant
cases, the lower courts have uniformly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1654, providing that ‘parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel,’ does not allow corporations,
partnerships, or associations to appear in federal court otherwise than through a licensed attorney.”
Rowland, 506 U.S. at 202 (footnote omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1654). The Court opined that
the holding in In re Holliday’s Tax Services, Inc. diverged from federal precedent and had not
been followed by other federal courts. Id. at 202 n.5. Interestingly, the Holliday’s Court’s holding
that an exception could be made to the general rule that artificial entities must advance their claims
through counsel in individual cases was based not on the Judiciary Act but on the inherent powers
doctrine. In re Holliday’s Tax Servs., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Modifying
the absolute rule of corporate representation in bankruptcy cases, rather, rests on the inherent
power of a court to supervise the proper administration of justice.”), aff’d sub nom., Holliday’s
Tax Servs., Inc. v. Hauptman, 614 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit relied on this dicta
to overrule a prior Ninth Circuit opinion that permitted a nonlawyer partner to represent a
partnership pro se. In re Am. W. Airlines, 40 F.3d 1058, 1059 (9th Cir. 1994), overruling in part
United States v. Reeves, 431 F.2d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1970). Commentators have noted that this
result was not necessarily required since the propriety of pro se representation of artificial entities
was not before the Court in Rowland, and federal courts have relied upon their inherent powers to
grant additional exceptions to the general rule since that time. See, e.g., Matthew Cormack, Note,
The Cost of Representation: An Argument for Permitting Pro Se Representation of Small
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 222, 238–40 (2011).
89. See, e.g., Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d. Cir.
1990).
90. RABEEA ASSY, INJUSTICE IN PERSON: THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 2, 38 (2015).
91. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833–34 (“[I]t is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor,
has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a
defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. The value of state-appointed counsel was not
unappreciated by the Founders, yet the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them.
And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt
that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice. . . . [A]lthough he may conduct his own
defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the
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counsel mandate through this lens of autonomy hold the right to selfrepresentation inapplicable to child litigants as children are incapable of
making an autonomous choice to proceed without counsel that is
deserving of courts’ respect.92 Thus, when a court considers whether a
nonlawyer parent can “appear as [an attorney] on behalf of” his or her
child, the court must be concerned only with regulating the practice of
law,93 not with the self-representation guarantee.
Respect for dignity and autonomy remains an important theoretical
basis for the right to self-representation, but it is not the full story. The
right to self-representation also provides a critical guarantee of court
access for those who cannot afford counsel. This court access foundation
for the right to self-representation also has deep historical roots as a
reaction against the power of the barristers, who once had exclusive
authority to bring cases before the English court of common pleas.94 The
right to self-representation thus levels the playing field between indigent
and well-resourced litigants, including the government, by at least
ensuring access to the judiciary to all.95
Children’s legal incapacity and vulnerability provide principled bases
for not extending the right of self-representation to children directly. But,
as courts have recognized, the counsel mandate is “in some tension with
the general notion that a person may appear in court without the benefit

individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
92. Id. (“The choice to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors who under state law
cannot determine their own legal actions. There is thus no individual choice to proceed pro se for
courts to respect, and solely the policy at stake concerns the exclusion of non-licensed persons to
appear as attorneys on behalf of others.” (citation omitted)), quoted in Tindall v. Poultney High
Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 285 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005); see Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874,
876 (9th Cir. 1997) (reasoning the same as Cheung); Gallo v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 446,
447–48 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“The right to proceed pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1654 reflects a
policy of allowing individuals to conduct their own litigation in the manner they choose. This
right, however, does not attach to children, who are unable to make an intelligent choice in this
regard on their own.”).
93. Johns, 114 F.3d at 876–77; Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61 (discussing the court’s concern with
minors receiving adequate “trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected”).
94. See Robert A. Lanier, The English Legal System: A Mirror for Us, 19 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 427, 437 (1989).
95. See Roger Michalski, Trans-Personal Procedures, 47 CONN. L. REV. 321, 367 (2014).
This aim also provides a principled basis for excluding corporations from the general right to selfrepresentation, which does not equally apply to children. See id. at 367 & n.254 (noting that
exceptions must be based on probabilities and will not apply perfectly in every case, as for
example, a rich individual may be permitted to proceed pro se, whereas a poor corporation will
not be). As the Supreme Court explained: “[C]orporations can often perfectly well pay court costs
and retain paid legal counsel in spite of being temporarily ‘insolvent’ . . . it is far from clear that
corporate insolvency is appropriately analogous to individual indigency.” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 206 (1993).
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(or expense) of professional assistance.”96 The goal of ensuring court
access can be advanced by extending the right to parents who seek to
advance their children’s claims.
Under the second interpretation of the Judiciary Act, courts have held
that the Act not only applies to children, but guarantees a child litigant
the “right” to seek counsel should the child wish to have representation.97
These courts conclude that this right to have legal representation is
personal to the child litigant, and a parent lacks the authority to waive the
right on the child’s behalf.98
This framing of the Judiciary Act is confusing for several reasons.
First, it identifies the retention of counsel as a “right” rather than a
litigation choice. As there is generally no federal right to counsel in civil
matters, and the Judiciary Act makes no provision for appointment of
counsel for those “entitled” to it, the “right” to counsel the courts identify
cannot be understood as one to have counsel provided by the court in
every case, but only to choose whether to retain counsel oneself.99
Further, framing the Judiciary Act as conferring a “right” to counsel
disrupts the typical authority conferred to adult representatives to control
litigation brought on behalf of children. This framing reserves this
particular litigation choice—whether to be represented by counsel—to
child litigants without explanation for why this litigation choice should
be set apart from all other choices routinely reserved to children’s legal
representatives, such as whether, when, and where to bring suit, what
claims to advance, what information to disclose, and whom to sue.100
Finally, this framing reserves the choice to children only if a parent
decides a certain way. That is, parents are precluded from waiving the
right to retain counsel on behalf of a child, but parents are fully entitled
to exercise the right to advance children’s claims through counsel,
without the need for children’s input. In practice, by framing the choice
96. Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2005).
97. See, e.g., Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991). The
Supreme Court has not found a constitutional right to representation by counsel in civil cases.
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981).
98. See Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 883; McDaniel ex rel. Oltremari v. Kan. Soc. & Rehab.
Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1332 (D. Kan. 1994).
99. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444–48 (2011) (holding that the appointment of
counsel is not required in every civil contempt proceeding that threatens incarceration, rather it
requires a case specific determination); Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981)
(finding that the right to appointment of counsel for indigent litigants is recognized only in cases
that actually place a litigant’s physical liberty at risk); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967)
(concluding that due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigent juveniles in
delinquency proceedings that may result in a loss of physical liberty).
100. See, e.g., In re Moore, 209 U.S. 490, 499 (1908) (finding that next friends have the
authority to select the venue of a case on behalf of a child litigant and reasoning that denying next
friends this ability would deprive children of the equal protection of the law), abrogated by Ex
parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363 (1911).
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of whether to retain counsel as a right to legal representation, vesting
waiver of this right exclusively in the child, and concluding that legal
capacity precludes the child from executing the waiver, courts tie their
hands while excluding children from the courts.
The third and fourth interpretations of the Judiciary Act relevant to
this analysis point out that the Act, by its terms, only guarantees the right
of self-representation to parties representing their own interests.101
Nonetheless, these courts also diverge on whether litigants other than
individuals representing their own interests must retain counsel under the
Act. Some courts conclude that the Act simply does not guarantee the
right to self-representation to litigants who represent the interests of
another.102 Thus, the decision of whether such litigants must retain
counsel is reserved to court discretion.103 By contrast, other courts hold
that the Judiciary Act restricts the presentation of claims before courts to
allow only individuals representing their own interests or attorneys to
litigate claims.104 Such courts construe this restriction as absolute and not
subject to individualized exceptions.105
c. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)
In addition to inherent powers and the Judiciary Act, courts have
evaluated the counsel mandate in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(c). As with the inherent powers doctrine and the Judiciary
Act, court opinions differ widely regarding whether and how Rule 17(c)
impacts whether a parent can bring a claim pro se on behalf of a child.
101. See United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008)
(stating that the Judiciary Act limits circumstances in which civil litigants may appear without
counsel to only cases in which parties “plead and conduct their own cases personally” (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012))); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d. Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause
pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the
other’s cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to him.”). Whether parents could
be considered real parties in interest in cases they bring on behalf of their children is a complex
question I will address in a forthcoming article. Because of the question’s complexity and
uncertainty and because courts considering the counsel mandate uniformly assume that parents
advancing their children’s claims are not real parties in interest, this Article does not evaluate this
question.
102. See, e.g., Fraass Survival Sys., Inc. v. Absentee Shawnee Econ. Dev. Auth., 817 F.
Supp. 7, 9–10 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The fact
that a minor or incompetent person must be represented by a next friend, guardian ad litem, or
other fiduciary does not alter the principle embodied in § 1654 that a non-attorney is not allowed
to represent another individual in federal court litigation without the assistance of counsel. If the
representative of the minor or incompetent person is not himself an attorney, he must be
represented by an attorney in order to conduct the litigation.”); Turner v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 407 F.
Supp. 451, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
105. See Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1310 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating the
Judiciary Act prohibits a non-attorney from appearing without counsel “on behalf of a
partnership”).
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Rule 17(c) governs the appearance of minors and other persons who
lack legal capacity as litigants before the federal courts. The text of Rule
17(c) does not mention attorneys. The full text of the Rule provides:
(c) Minor or Incompetent Person.
(1) With a Representative. The following representatives
may sue or defend on behalf of a minor or an incompetent
person:
(A) a general guardian;
(B) a committee;
(C) a conservator; or
(D) a like fiduciary.
(2) Without a Representative. A minor or an incompetent
person who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another
appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent
person who is unrepresented in an action.106
Courts have advanced three different interpretations of the
implications of this text for parents seeking to advance their children’s
claims pro se. First, some courts have held that the text of Rule 17(c) itself
affirmatively requires adults to retain counsel to advance the claims of
children.107 By contrast, other courts have concluded that Rule 17(c)
cannot be understood to implicitly override the general restriction against
nonlawyers representing the interests of others.108 Finally, still other
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
107. See, e.g., Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986); Bellamy v. Tennessee,
Nos. 3 09 1067, 3:09mc0135, 2009 WL 3734130, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 6, 2009) (“Rule 17(c)
clearly envisions representation by counsel.”).
108. See, e.g., Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 285 n.3 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the representative of an infant ‘may sue or
defend on behalf of [him or her],’ and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that ‘[a]
pro se notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the signer and the signer’s spouse and
minor children (if they are parties), unless the notice clearly indicates otherwise.’ We do not read
either provision to imply that a non-lawyer parent can represent a minor child in federal court
proceedings.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting FED R. CIV. P. 17(c); and
then quoting FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(2))); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 231 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“[U]nder Rule 17(c), a representative or guardian ‘may sue or defend on behalf of the
infant.’ It is, however, well established in this Circuit that the right to proceed pro se in federal
court does not give non-lawyer parents the right to represent their children in proceedings before
a federal court. Other circuits follow this rule as well.” (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
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courts hold that Rule 17(c) is inapposite, as it dictates only which adults
can make litigation-related decisions for a child, and thus the Rule does
not alter the general rule that a parent cannot advance a child’s claims
without counsel.109
The conclusion that Rule 17(c) is inapposite to the question of whether
a representative for a child must retain counsel seems the most accurate
reading of the text. Yet, all three of these interpretations overlook what is
perhaps the Rule’s most critical contribution to this issue. Rule 17(c)’s
central function is facilitating children’s access to courts. The Rule
bestows upon courts both the responsibility to ensure that child litigants’
interests are protected and the flexibility to determine what is needed.110
Rather than prescribe steps that must be taken in every case involving a
child, Rule 17(c) grants courts wide latitude to determine how a child’s
interests are best served under the child’s particular circumstances.111
Courts fail to meet their responsibilities under 17(c) through inaction—
by leaving children’s interests unprotected.112 Thus, courts cannot simply
dismiss children’s claims in response to procedural deficiencies, such as
the lack of an adult representative; courts have a responsibility under Rule
17(c) to ensure children’s interests are protected and the litigation can
proceed.113
3. Protecting Children
The second key justification courts provide for the counsel mandate is
that it is necessary to carry out the courts’ inherent responsibility to
protect children’s interests.114 Courts have expressed this objective in
17(c))), abrogated by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516
(2007).
109. See, e.g., Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 170 n.9 (E.D. Va.
1994) (“[L]inking the question of non-lawyer representation of others with Rule 17’s provisions
confuses the issue. . . . Part (c) of [Rule 17] says that an infant can sue through a next friend. This
means that the next friend is trusted to make decisions for the minor child—whether to sue, when
to sue, when and on what terms to settle, and the like. But Rule 17 does not address the question
whether a non-lawyer parent, when suing as next friend of the child, must be represented by legal
counsel.”); see also Berrios, 564 F.3d at 134 (“The fact that a minor or incompetent person must
be represented by a next friend, guardian ad litem, or other fiduciary does not alter the principle
embodied in § 1654 that a non-attorney is not allowed to represent another individual in federal
court litigation without the assistance of counsel. If the representative of the minor or incompetent
person is not himself an attorney, he must be represented by an attorney in order to conduct the
litigation.”).
110. See id. The full text of Rule 17(c) is set forth supra Section I.B.1.c.
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
112. See Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 139–40 (3d Cir. 1989).
113. See id. at 140.
114. See, e.g., Gallo v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“The rule
against allowing pro se parents to litigate on behalf of minors is aimed at protecting the rights of
children.”).
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strong terms, with several declaring: “[T]he infant is always the ward of
every court wherein his rights or property are brought into jeopardy, and
is entitled to the most jealous care that no injustice be done to him.”115
Rather than making individualized determinations regarding children’s
interests in this context, courts often rely on the generalized assumption
that legal representation will always better protect children’s interests
than will permitting children’s claims to proceed pro se.116
Courts’ specific concerns typically center on the risk that a child’s
legal claims will be compromised by the choices made by the child’s
representative.117 With limited exceptions, courts have not focused
attention on the harms to children’s interests posed by the dismissal of
their claims.118 Instead, courts tend to view dismissal without prejudice
as protective, as dismissal (in theory) protects against collateral estoppel
and reserves the choice of whether to advance their claims with legal

115. Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(quoting Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997)), abrogated in part by
Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Osei-Afriyie v.
Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting duPont v. S.
Nat’l Bank of Hous., 771 F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1985)).
116. “It goes without saying that it is not in the interests of minors or incompetents that they
be represented by non-attorneys. Where they have claims that require adjudication, they are
entitled to trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected.” Cheung v. Youth
Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990), quoted in Mann v. Boatright,
477 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 2007); Johns, 114 F.3d at 876–77; and Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at
883.
117. See Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he point of the rule
forbidding a next friend to litigate pro se on behalf of another person is to protect the rights of the
represented party. Discussing the application of the general rule outside the child-party setting,
we observed that ‘[m]any good reasons exist for the strict adherence to this rule, not the least of
which is that a party may be bound, or his rights waived, by his legal representative.’ This concern
is even stronger in the context of a minor or other person who is unable to speak for herself.”
(second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d
829, 830 (7th Cir. 1986))); Gallo v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“It
is generally not in the interest of a child to be represented by a non-attorney, who will likely be
unable to adequately protect her rights and vigorously prosecute litigation on her behalf.”).
118. See, e.g., Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“Although the rule stems largely from our desire to protect the interests of minors, we think it
may, in some instances, undermine a child’s interest in having claims pursued for him or her when
counsel is as a practical matter unavailable.” (citations omitted)). Some district courts have
permitted parents to proceed pro se in individual cases. Appellate courts have upheld such
exercises of discretion in cases where denying the parent the ability to proceed pro se would
entirely deprive the children of a remedy. See, e.g., Elustra, 595 F.3d at 706–07 (permitting
motion to set aside judgment filed pro se by parent on behalf of child to proceed, in part, because,
as time for filing had passed, dismissing the motion would deny child the opportunity to move to
set aside the judgment altogether); Murphy, 297 F.3d at 201 (“It is hardly in the best interest of
[the child] to vacate an injunction that inures to his benefit so that he may re-litigate this issue
below with licensed representation in order to re-secure a victory already obtained.”).
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counsel or without for children to make once they reach adulthood.119 As
further discussed in Section III.A, common conceptions of courts’
responsibilities to protect children are at once overly broad and overly
narrow in focusing primarily on children’s interests in legal
representation.
4. Unstated Concerns
Courts’ ready use of the counsel mandate might also stem from court
concerns about the viability of individual claims. Opinions in several
prominent counsel mandate cases (as well as several less so) indicate that
the courts had a dim view of the merits of the claims and the motivations
of the parents advancing them.120 Courts also may have biases about the
likely validity of certain types of claims—viewing civil rights claims, for
example, with more skepticism than contracts disputes.121 Since plaintiffs
in winning civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled
to have their attorneys’ fees paid by defendants, courts also may expect
that meritorious civil rights cases will have counsel.122 Any such biases
about the merits of particular types of claims might be exacerbated when
judges are faced with parents seeking to litigate pro se, as such parents
may be more likely to have a different socioeconomic background than
the judge, which could unconsciously trigger stereotypes that shape the
judge’s understanding of the motivations and circumstances of the
parents before them.123 Such biases may disproportionately impact
119. See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 49 F. App’x 618, 620 (7th Cir. 2002) (vacating
dismissal with prejudice and remanding for entry of dismissal without prejudice as to children’s
claims); Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that courts’
duty to protect children requires the entry of dismissal without prejudice to protect child from
harm caused by parent’s failure to abide by court order to retain counsel and permit the child to
bring the case on his own when he reaches eighteen). But see infra Section II.A.2.
120. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991); Cheung v.
Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1990); Meeker v. Kercher, 782
F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986). Several district court opinions identified parents’ representatives
as recognized repeat litigants in those and other courts. See Loper v. Cleveland Police
Headquarters, No. 1:16CV2842, 2017 WL 2063018, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2017) (noting that
plaintiff had filed several state and federal court actions relating to his claims); Coon v. Food Lion
No. 3:14–CV–05, 2014 WL 791069, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 26, 2014) (recognizing parent as
repeatedly filing); Bethel v. Middletown City Sch. Dist., No. 1:11–cv–206, 2011 WL 2038597, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2011) (recognizing that plaintiffs had filed multiple similar cases); Mannix
v. Humer, No. 10 C 5063, 2011 WL 116888, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2011) (noting that plaintiffs
had filed previous suits in the same district).
121. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1162
(2012).
122. Barriers that prevent litigants with meritorious claims from securing counsel are
explored in Section III.A.
123. Professor Michelle Benedetto Nietz argues that “[s]ince people are ‘more favorably
disposed to the familiar, and fear or become frustrated with the unfamiliar,’ the wealthy positions
of most judges may prevent them from fully appreciating the challenges faced by poor litigants in
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members of racial and cultural minority groups, as such groups
disproportionately experience poverty and educational disadvantage.124
Conversely, courts’ endorsement of the counsel mandate may stem from
court tendencies to disfavor trials, generally.125 Regardless of its
motivations, the reflexive application of the counsel mandate allows
courts to avoid dealing with the challenges posed by these underlying
concerns and instead remove the cases from their dockets.
Taken together, the legal analysis applied by Meeker and its progeny
in support of the counsel mandate is inadequate. Some courts have
expressed serious misgivings about the rule and applied it only out of
deference to precedent.126 Other courts have declined to apply the rule in
the specific context of Social Security Insurance benefits appeals.127 The
proliferation of such decisions has led recent courts to describe the rule
as “not ironclad.”128 These departures suggest that the time is ripe to
examine whether the counsel mandate should continue to bind the federal
courts and whether a new rule is warranted.
II. CONTRAVENING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS
Because it excludes low-income children and their parents from
courts, the counsel mandate undermines children’s access to civil justice,
parents’ rights and responsibilities toward their children, and democratic
norms.
A. Children’s Access to Justice
As the Second Circuit conveyed in expressing misgivings about the
counsel mandate:

their courtrooms.” Michelle Benedetto Nietz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 137, 142 (2013) (quoting Rose Matsui Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal
Sentencing, 24 JUDGES J. 6, 53 (1985)) (stating that “[l]ike all people, judges are influenced by
their economic backgrounds,” and noting that federal district court judges earned $174,000 per
year in 2010, more than triple the median income in the United States at that time). See generally
Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems
of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010) (discussing implicit bias in the legal system); Kang et al., supra note
121 (discussing judicial implicit bias).
124. See Nietz, supra note 123, at 148–49.
125. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004)
(documenting the decline of civil trials in federal and state court).
126. See, e.g., Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2005).
127. See, e.g., Adams ex rel. D.J.W. v. Astrue, 659 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2011);
Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2002).
128. Adams, 659 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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Although the rule stems largely from our desire to protect the
interests of minors, we think it may, in some instances, undermine
a child’s interest in having claims pursued for him or her when
counsel is as a practical matter unavailable. Indeed, although the
general rule serves the salutary purpose of making competent
representation of children more likely, in some cases—perhaps in
the appeal before us—it may force minors out of court altogether.
While the Cheung court noted that “[t]o allow guardians to bring
pro se litigation also invites abuse,” not allowing guardians to do
so—if they are regarded by the court as reasonably competent in
this regard—may thus result, in some instances, in unredressed
violations of children’s rights or interests.129
The counsel mandate deprives children of access to justice as a
practical matter because low-income children and their families face
monumental challenges in securing counsel and it undermines the
viability of their legal claims. Further, the mandate obstructs children’s
access to justice as a legal matter by depriving children of their
fundamental right of access to the courts.
1. Practical Implications
a. The Inaccessibility of Counsel
As a practical matter, the counsel mandate results in the exclusion
from the courts of children who are indigent or of moderate financial
means. Civil litigants have no constitutionally guaranteed right to the
assistance of counsel.130 Federal courts can, but rarely do, request counsel
to represent litigants who cannot afford representation.131 Courts have
shown no special propensity to appoint counsel for children in civil
proceedings brought on their behalf.132 Consequently, court mandates
129. Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906
F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)).
130. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“We must decide whether the Due
Process Clause grants an indigent defendant . . . a right to state-appointed counsel . . . . This
Court’s precedents provide no definitive answer to that question.”); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25–27 (1981) (stating that there is generally not a right to counsel except in
certain circumstances, such as the deprivation of an individual’s liberty).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2012).
132. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding district
court decision not to appoint counsel and dismiss case brought by parent on behalf of child);
Pierson v. Allison, No. 1:o8cv2o8–JMR, 2009 WL 3049220, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 17, 2009)
(declining to appoint counsel for minor plaintiff and dismissing case without prejudice); Dunbar
v. Colasanto, No. 305CV1234(CFD), 2006 WL 798883, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2006) (declining
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that parents retain counsel for children are effectively mandates that
parents take on the financial burden of attorneys’ fees. As numerous
studies and scholars have documented, this burden proves
insurmountable for many in the United States.133
Children represent a disproportionate number of those living in
poverty in the United States. In 2015, “[c]hildren represented 23.1
percent of the total population in 2015 and 33.6 percent of the people in
poverty.”134 Although these children and their families would qualify for
free legal services, they would not necessarily receive them.135
There is a dearth of legal services available to meet the legal needs of
those who cannot afford to pay. The Legal Services Corporation, created
by Congress to provide public financial support for civil legal services
for those living in poverty, today has a budget of less than half of what it
received at its peak in the early 1980s.136 This shortfall directly impacts
the number of lawyers available to serve low-income people, as most
legal aid lawyers work for Legal Services Corporation-funded
organizations.137 “Nationally, there are well over ten times more private
to warrant appointment of counsel requested by parent bringing claim on child’s behalf because
claims “not ‘likely to be of substance’”); Polk v. City of Corsicana, No. 3:05-CV-0861-G(BH),
2006 WL 385127, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2006) (denying appointment of counsel requested by
parent bringing case on child’s behalf); Burr v. Chitty, No. 3:04-CV-2562-G, 2005 WL 264943,
at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2005) (denying appointment of counsel in part because of inadequate
demonstration of efforts to obtain counsel and questioning whether parent, as representative and
not party in the case, even has the power to request an attorney on behalf of a child litigant). But
see Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys. Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 169, 172 (E.D. Va. 1994) (appointing
counsel to represent minor plaintiff in products liability case initiated by child’s parent).
133. See infra notes 135–47 and accompanying text.
134. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-256(RV), INCOME AND
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 14 (2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XD8-ZUK8]. More than
30 million children—over forty percent of all children in the United States—had family incomes
below two hundred percent of the federal poverty level, id. at 17 tbl.5, meaning their families
earned no more than $48,500 per year for a family of four. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty
Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. 3236, 3237 (Jan. 22, 2015). Nearly 19 million children (more than
twenty-five percent) had family incomes below one hundred and twenty-five percent of the federal
poverty level, PROCTOR ET AL., at 17 tbl.5, meaning their families earned $30,312 per year or less
for a family of four. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3237.
135. The Legal Services Corporation, the largest funder of free legal services in the United
States, set income eligibility guidelines for free legal services supported by its funding in 2015 at
one hundred and twenty-five percent of federal poverty guidelines set forth by the Department of
Health and Human Services. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 1611 app. A (2015). Some civil legal aid
organizations are able to use different sources of funding to offer legal services to individuals with
incomes up to 200% of the poverty guidelines. See Luz E. Herrera, Training LawyerEntrepreneurs, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 887, 895 n.50 (2012).
136. HOUSEMAN, supra note 25, at 8, 88–90; Steinberg, supra note 2, at 770 & n.159 (“While
Congressional appropriations appear static from year to year, funding has dropped forty-nine
percent in inflation-adjusted dollars over the past thirty years.”).
137. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 25, at 19–20.

2019]

NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NO ACCESS WITHOUT

857

attorneys providing personal legal services to people in the general
population than there are legal aid attorneys serving the poor.”138
Consequently, legal aid organizations are only able to take on fewer than
half of the legal problems that individuals who qualify for services ask
them to resolve.139 On average, “[l]ow-income Americans receive
inadequate or no professional legal help for eighty-six percent of the civil
legal problems they face in a given year.”140
Given these realities, it is no surprise that litigants across the United
States are increasingly representing themselves in federal as well as state
courts. Non-prisoner pro se filings now comprise nearly ten percent of
the docket of the federal district courts.141 Litigants’ reasons for
proceeding pro se vary, but inability to pay stands out as a primary driving
force.142 Importantly, it is not only those who qualify as “poor” under the
federal government’s poverty measures who cannot afford counsel.
Individuals and families of moderate means are ineligible for civil legal
aid, yet increasingly are unable to pay private attorney’s fees as well.143

138. Id. at 19 (footnote omitted). A 2009 study by the Legal Services Corporation found that
whereas there was “only one legal aid lawyer” available for every “6,415 low-income people in
the country,” there was one lawyer providing legal services for private individuals and families
“for every 429 people in the general population.” Id.
139. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF
LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 13 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJustice
Gap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5SY-5UHZ]. People often fail to seek legal assistance,
even for significant legal problems, because they do not recognize the problems as legal, prefer
to try to resolve them on their own, do not know where to seek help, or cannot afford attorneys’
fees. See id.
140. Id. at 30.
141. JEFRI WOOD, FED. JUD. CTR., PRO SE CASE MANAGEMENT FOR NONPRISONER CIVIL
LITIGATION, at vii n.2 (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/Pro_Se_Case_
Management_for_Nonprisoner_Civil_Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRJ3-CN5H] (“In fiscal
year 2015, 25,117 nonprisoner pro se civil cases were filed in the district courts, or 9% of the total
279,036 civil filings.”). As the proportion of pro se, non-prisoner litigation has continually
increased, federal courts have had to turn their attention to how to accommodate pro se parties to
ensure that they have meaningful access to advance meritorious claims. Id. at vii & n.3.
142. JOY MOSES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S PRO SE CRISIS AND HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF
UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS 4 (2011); Steinberg, supra note 2, at 752 (“The reasons for the spike
in pro se litigation are only partially understood, but most studies that have examined the
characteristics of unrepresented litigants conclude that poverty is the primary force driving
individuals to represent themselves in court.”).
143. See MOSES, supra note 142, at 3–4; Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1785, 1785 (2001); Steinberg, supra note 2, at 752–53; Debra Cassens Weiss, MiddleClass Dilemma: Can’t Afford Lawyers, Can’t Qualify for Legal Aid, A.B.A. J. (July 22,
2010, 1:36 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/middle-class_dilemma_cant_afford_
lawyers_cant_qualify_for_legal_aid/?icn=most_read [https://perma.cc/9K88-DEG2] (stating that
lawyers are too expensive for a lot of people, including those who earn “too much money to
qualify for legal aid”).
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Financial barriers are not the only obstacles that prevent litigants from
securing counsel. Poverty alone cannot explain the failure to retain
counsel by litigants pursuing legal claims under statutes with fee-shifting
provisions, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims that could secure
significant contingency fees. Research suggests that personal
characteristics also play a role in an individual’s access to counsel.
Researchers have documented, for example, that African Americans as a
group have a harder time finding lawyers who will help them,144 and that
lawyer advertising often fails to encourage disadvantaged groups to seek
help by primarily (if not entirely) displaying images of white lawyers and
clients145 and by using language that is inaccessible to much of the adult
population.146 By contrast, litigants pursuing certain other legal remedies
may face particular difficulty in securing private counsel, for example,
where potential cost recoveries are limited.147
For all of these reasons, the mandate that parents retain counsel to
advance their children’s claims cannot be met by a substantial portion of
families—far more than the forty percent who could qualify for free legal
aid. Thus, the counsel mandate effectively excludes children of low and
moderate means from the federal courts.
b. Detrimental Effects on Children’s Claims
The counsel mandate also undermines children’s ability to access the
courts as a practical matter because of its detrimental effects on the
viability of children’s claims. The practical effect of the counsel mandate
for a child whose family cannot afford attorney’s fees is delay—either
until the family gathers sufficient funds to retain counsel, or until the
child reaches majority and can bring the suit herself pro se. Delay is
detrimental to children’s civil claims for several reasons. First, statutes of
144. Ellen Berrey, Robert L. Nelson, and Laura Beth Nielsen, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY a t 1 0 9 – 2 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) .
145. Jim Hawkins and Renee Knake, The Behavioral Economics of Lawyer Advertising: An
Empirical Assessment, 2019 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (hypothesizing that “individuals are
more likely to utilize legal services if they see themselves as similar to their lawyers in personal
beliefs, values, and communication,” and finding that nearly 80% of lawyer websites surveyed
“had pictures of exclusively white attorneys and clients”).
146. Id. (finding that lawyer websites surveyed were written at an 11th grade level, whereas
50% of adults in the United States cannot read books written at an 8th grade level and 21% of
adults read below a fifth grade level).
147. Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 n.1 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We are aware of some of
the stated impediments to the delivery of legal services in children SSI cases. For example,
potential contingent fees are small and attorneys ‘cannot be assured payment because the SSA
does not automatically withhold a portion of a successful claimant’s retroactive benefits for
attorneys’ fees.’ Mindful of such problems, we do not believe that they should be permanent
barriers to legal aid. Rather they should be a spur to take steps to improve the effective
administration of justice.” (citation omitted) (quoting Maldonado ex rel. Maldonado v. Apfel, 55
F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1999))).
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limitations do not always toll during childhood.148 Thus, delaying the
adjudication of a claim until a child has the legal capacity to bring the
case pro se might entirely deprive a child of the ability to pursue a legal
remedy.149 Even if a cause of action survives until adulthood, a child is
not likely to be in a better position to litigate the claim at that time than a
parent would be when the claim first arises. Children whose parent(s)
cannot afford counsel during the child’s minority are unlikely to suddenly
have the funds to retain counsel themselves once they reach adulthood.
Moreover, eighteen-year-olds are unlikely to be better prepared to
advance a claim pro se as compared to a parent, who, at a minimum, has
significantly more life experience to draw upon. Delay also precludes
parents from bringing claims to remedy present, ongoing harms to
children or to seek benefits only meaningful during childhood.150 Finally,
no matter the character of the claim, delay undermines the strength of a
case as evidence goes stale, witnesses disappear, and even party
recollections dim about the operative events.
As a practical matter, the counsel mandate itself may deprive indigent
children of the leverage that legal rights and the threat of litigation
provide in disputes with better resourced opponents, and the opportunity
for alternative methods of dispute resolution that such leverage provides.
Adversaries who know that a child’s family lacks the means to retain
counsel and is thus unlikely to be able to proceed with a suit are unlikely
to be motivated to negotiate a resolution.151 Thus, under the counsel
148. See, e.g., Gallo v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting that
causes of action under the Federal Torts Claims Act do not toll during infancy).
149. State constitutional precedent varies on the question of whether the expiration of
statutes of limitation during minority itself violates children’s state constitutional rights to access
the courts. Compare Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., 692 P.2d 280, 286 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc)
(“The minor possesses a right guaranteed by the constitution, but cannot assert it unless someone
else, over whom he has no control, learns about it, understands it, is aware of the need to take
prompt action, and in fact takes such action.”), and Kordus v. Montes, 337 P.3d 1138, 1141–42,
1148 (Wyo. 2014) (applying the two-year statute of limitations to a medical malpractice claim by
juvenile patient violated her fundamental right to access the courts under the Wyoming
Constitution and noting that although a next friend could bring a claim on a minor’s behalf within
the statutory period during the minor’s period of minority, “a next friend may or may not
volunteer” (quoting Dye v. Fremont Cty. Sch. Dist., 820 P.2d 982, 985 (Wyo. 1991))), with Willis
v. Mullett, 561 S.E. 2d 705, 709, 711 (Va. 2002) (finding that the expiration of a statute of
limitations during minority did not unlawfully abridge minor’s rights because the legislature could
reasonably presume that an adult responsible for a minor’s welfare would act diligently to protect
the minor’s interests).
150. Courts have cited this concern, among others, in carving out an exception to the counsel
mandate in cases brought to appeal adverse decisions regarding Social Security Insurance
benefits. See supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text.
151. Justice Brennan argued that the holding in Boddie v. Connecticut should be broadened
since court enforcement may be the only effective remedy for individuals seeking to protect any
legal right and the government always has the “ultimate monopoly of all judicial process[es] and
attendant enforcement machinery.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 387 (1971) (Brennan,
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mandate, children may be at once stuck with courts as the only possible
forum for dispute resolution and precluded from accessing courts. For all
of these reasons, the counsel mandate undermines the viability of
children’s claims and may entirely deny children the opportunity to seek
judicial resolution of a dispute.
2. Constitutional Implications
As a legal matter, the counsel mandate contravenes children’s
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. The Supreme
Court recognizes the right of access to the courts to be fundamental,152
deriving from several constitutional guarantees.153 The right is one of the
“highest and most essential privileges of citizenship.”154 It not only
promotes orderly government and peaceful dispute resolution, but also is
essential as “the right conservative of all other rights.”155 Because the
right to court access is a “basic” one, it “call[s] for a standard of judicial
review at least as searching, and in some cases more searching, than the
standard that applies to sex-based classifications.”156
The right of access to the courts encompasses “both equal protection
and due process concerns.”157 Court access guarantees are central to equal
protection, which was intended to ensure “that all persons . . . should have
J., concurring). Scholars likewise have noted that litigation plays a critical role as an equalizer in
disputes faced by poor people, who may lack other tools (such as a refusal to deal in the future)
available to litigants with greater financial means, and that the imposition of fees and costs that
prevent indigent litigants from accessing courts also deprive the poor of the leverage that the
credible threat of litigation offers, which encourages negotiation of disputes with opponents of
greater financial means. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 234.
152. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
153. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
154. Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). See also Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 280 (1876) (stating that the right of access to the courts “lies at the
foundation of all well-ordered systems of jurisprudence” and is “founded in the first principles of
natural justice” (quoting Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins., 3 F. Cas. 1184, 1187 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839)
(No. 1793))).
155. Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., supra 154; see also United Transp. Union v. State Bar
of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 580 (1971) (applying the First Amendment right of court access to Federal
Employers’ Liability Act lawsuits); Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 253–54 (“The right of access
to the courts, therefore, is both fundamental and instrumental. Or, more accurately, the right of
access to the courts, like certain other rights, stretches across and protects a continuum of interests
from the trivial to the most significant. Aside from its general use in the resolution of private
disputes, access to courts takes its specific importance and coloration from the right or interest it
is being used to protect.”).
156. Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 529.
157. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996); accord Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17
(1956). See generally Goodpaster, supra note 27 (asserting that indigent people must be afforded
free access to courts because of their equal protection and due process rights). Due process and
equal protection rights constrain federal government action under the Fifth Amendment. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93–94 (1976) (per curiam); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954).
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like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons
and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement
of contracts.”158 Financial impediments to court access, such as fees and
security bonds, implicate equal protection concerns by treating indigent
litigants differently than those with wealth.159 The Supreme Court
traditionally disfavors status-based distinctions rooted in wealth and
poverty,160 particularly where such distinctions inhibit democratic
participation.161 The Court also disfavors status-based distinctions
between children, particularly with regard to circumstances beyond
children’s control.162 Court access guarantees are likewise central to due
process, which legitimizes the vestment of dispute resolution powers in
courts by guaranteeing that such processes will be just.163 Impediments
to court access implicate procedural due process rights by depriving
litigants of the opportunity to be heard.164
The Court established the clearest due process and equal protectionbased court access guarantees in criminal and quasi-criminal cases,165
158. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
159. See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17, 19 (concluding that the denial of free trial transcripts to
indigent defendants seeking to appeal their convictions violates equal protection, as “[i]n criminal
trials[,] a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race,
or color”). Distinctions based on wealth are subject only to rational basis review. San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–29, 40 (1973).
160. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (striking down a poll tax as
violative of equal protection rights and stating that “[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored” (citation omitted)).
161. See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123–24 (highlighting how the imposition of tolls for
government services without accounting for differences in wealth raises constitutional concerns
when such tolls inhibit participation in the political process as voters and candidates and access
to judicial processes in criminal and quasi-criminal cases).
162. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (striking down a ban on free public
education for undocumented students and noting that the law “impose[d] a lifetime hardship on a
discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status”); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 72 (1968) (overturning state doctrine limiting claims for loss of parental consortium to
legitimate children and holding it invidious to discriminate against illegitimate children as a class
when they are blameless for the wrong done to their parent); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584, 2590, 2600 (2015) (striking down prohibitions against same sex marriage, in part
because of harm caused to children of same sex parents through no fault of the children).
163. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–76 (1971).
164. See id. at 380 (“[A] cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend due process because
it operates to foreclose a particular party’s opportunity to be heard.”); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 251–52.
165. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123–24 (holding that transcript fees must be waived for indigent
parents appealing termination of parental rights decisions, as “access to judicial processes in cases
criminal or ‘quasi criminal in nature’ [may not] turn on ability to pay” (citation omitted) (quoting
Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971))); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 710, 713–14
(1961) (holding that filing fees for criminal appeals must be waived for indigent defendants to
ensure them the equal protection of the law, as “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has” (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956))); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (concluding that transcript fees must
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holding these rights require courts to waive fees for indigent defendants
pursuing criminal appeals,166 indigent parents appealing terminations of
parental rights,167 and indigent putative fathers ordered to complete
paternity testing in state-initiated actions for child support.168 The Court
has carved out narrower guarantees for civil claims.169 The Court has
prohibited the imposition of fees upon indigent litigants in civil disputes
such as divorce, which involve fundamental constitutional rights that can
only be resolved in courts.170 By contrast, court fees in civil matters not
entailing fundamental rights and matters capable of resolution outside of
courts must only survive rational basis review,171 and may do so, even if
such fees would have the practical effect of preventing indigent parties
from pursuing the cause of action at issue.172
In addition to the Fifth Amendment guarantees of due process and
equal protection, the right of access to the courts also stems from the First

be waived for indigent criminal defendants appealing their convictions). These protections “do[]
not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the interests of society” but rather
“a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be
available to others able to pay their own way.” Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196–97.
166. See Smith, 365 U.S. at 713–14 (holding that filing fees for criminal appeals must be
waived for indigent defendants to ensure them the equal protection of the law); Griffin, 351 U.S.
at 19 (concluding that transcript fees must be waived for indigent criminal defendants appealing
their convictions).
167. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123–24.
168. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981).
169. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 567–71. The Supreme Court upheld several
preconditions to the filing of civil suits against procedural due process challenges as reasonable
requirements. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556–57 (1949)
(upholding a requirement that plaintiffs post security before filing a shareholder derivative
action); Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171, 181 (1924) (upholding a requirement that a
plaintiff must obtain a chemical analysis of fertilizer before filing suit against fertilizer
manufacturers).
170. Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376–77 (1971) (finding that filing fees
in divorce cases violate the due process rights of indigent plaintiffs because marriage is a
fundamental right and divorce cannot be accomplished outside of courts), with United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444–46 (1973) (finding that filing fees in bankruptcy cases do not violate due
process because they do not entail a fundamental right and the dispute is capable of resolution
through negotiation), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659–60 (1973) (finding that filing
fees in appeals of administrative welfare claim denials do not violate due process because the
disputes do not entail a fundamental right and claimants have access to the administrative
process). See also Ryan M. Rappa, Note, Getting Abused and Neglected Children into Court: A
Child’s Right of Access Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.
1419, 1444 (2011) (arguing that abuse and neglect matters, like divorces, involve fundamental
rights and issues that cannot be resolved outside of courts).
171. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123–24.
172. See Kras, 409 U.S. at 444–45; Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660; see also Cohen, 337 U.S. at
556–57 (upholding a requirement that plaintiffs post security before filing a shareholder derivative
action).
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Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances173
and the right to free speech.174 These guarantees preserve court access as
a means of political participation, protecting the opportunity to seek a
government-ordered remedy and hold the government and private actors
accountable for legal wrongs.175 These guarantees also safeguard court
access as a mechanism for the expression of values and political opinions
regarding the social order and the structure and operation of the
government.176
The Constitution generally guarantees children the same fundamental
rights as adults and constrains the government from acting in particular
ways towards children as well as adults.177 The scope of children’s
173. See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741–43 (1983) (concluding that
an NLRB injunction restraining a meritorious employer defamation suit against striking
employees was an unfair labor practice that violated the employer’s right of access, even if
improperly motivated); see also Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
513, 515 (1972) (concluding that antitrust rules against non-competitive practices cannot preclude
corporations from filing meritorious litigation, even if the suit potentially undermines competition
because the restriction infringes on the right to petition). See generally Andrews, supra note 27
(arguing that the right to access exists through the Petition Clause); Stephen A. Higginson, A Short
History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142
(1986) (discussing the history of the right to petition within the First Amendment); Tamara L.
Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of Domestic Violence, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 837 (2012) (tracing the history of the right to petition); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial
Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153
(1998) (explaining that the right to petition was historically the most efficient way to address a
grievance with the government).
174. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963).
175. See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 58
(1993); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc., 461 U.S. at 741; Cal. Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 513;
Button, 371 U.S. at 429–30 (“[U]nder the conditions of modern government, litigation may well
be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.”). Some
scholars frame the right to petition narrowly, as encompassing only “a right to file claims”; from
this perspective, so long as the government does not restrict the filing of a complaint, rights of
court access under the petition clause are protected. Andrews, supra note 27, at 625 (emphasis
omitted). Others argue that the right to petition is broader, encompassing not only the right to
request relief but also to secure a minimally adequate remedy. See, e.g., Benjamin Plener Cover,
The First Amendment Right to a Remedy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1741, 1747 (2017).
176. See Button, 371 U.S. at 429–30 (“In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not
a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of
equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro
community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression.”); see also United Transp.
Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (“[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
177. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“A child, merely on
account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.”); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 13 (1967) (“[W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”); see MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 260 (2005) (explaining that the ordinary rules regarding constitutional rights
are most often extended to children).
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constitutional rights may be narrower than those of adults because of “the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child rearing.”178
Nonetheless, the government cannot infringe children’s fundamental
rights on the basis of broad generalizations about children’s incapacity or
immaturity.179 Just as with adults, infringements of children’s
fundamental rights must be justified by important state interests.180 Thus,
Professor Martin Guggenheim posits that in determining whether
government action involving children is unconstitutional, the Court must
not only assess “whether the governmental conduct can be said to have
violated a norm of the Constitution,” but, if so, the Court must also
determine “whether there are special reasons not to apply the ordinary
rule to [children].”181
Applying Professor Guggenheim’s analysis leads to the conclusion
that the counsel mandate violates children’s right of access to the courts
under the Fifth and First Amendments. First, the counsel mandate
implicates constitutional norms regarding access to justice. The mandate
deprives indigent children of equal protection and due process by
requiring them to pay attorney fees as a prerequisite to access, and
thereby denying indigent children the right to be heard based on their
poverty.182 As courts have applied the mandate without regard to the
nature of the underlying claim, it denies children the opportunity to be
heard in the civil cases the Supreme Court has identified as deserving the
greatest scrutiny, including suits involving children’s fundamental rights
and disputes only resolvable by courts, as well as claims regarding lesser
rights and those (at least in theory) capable of resolution by other means.
Moreover, as statutes of limitations do not always toll during minority,
178. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634–35 (further noting “[t]he State is entitled to adjust its legal
system to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for ‘concern, . . . sympathy,
and . . . paternal attention.’”) (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)
(plurality opinion)).
179. See id. at 651; Developments in the Law — The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1156, 1241 (1980) [hereinafter The Constitution and the Family].
180. Two Supreme Court cases provide in dicta that the state must only articulate a
“significant state interest” to justify a law that infringes on a minor’s fundamental right. See Carey
v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74–75. Commentators criticize this
reasoning and argue that states should be required to demonstrate a “compelling” interest to justify
the infringement on the fundamental rights of children. See, e.g., The Constitution and the Family,
supra note 179, at 1198 & n.5, 1236, 1240.
181. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 177, at 260.
182. Interestingly, the Supreme Court recognized that limiting the ability of next friends to
make procedural choices on behalf of child litigants may deprive children of equal protection by
depriving them of procedural protections (here, venue) guaranteed to adults. In re Moore, 209
U.S. 490, 499 (1908), abrogated by Ex parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363 (1911).
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the mandate entirely deprives poor children of the opportunity to be heard
regarding claims that will expire before the child reaches adulthood and
can advance the claim him or herself.183 The mandate likewise deprives
children of the ability to petition the government for redress of grievances
and of the opportunity to utilize litigation for political expression. As
children are denied the right to vote, children’s right to court access
arguably deserves special protection as their primary means of
democratic participation.
Applying the second prong of Guggenheim’s analysis, although
children’s vulnerability and legal incapacity justify extending them
additional procedural protections in litigation, protectionist instincts do
not justify entirely depriving children of their fundamental right of access
to the courts. A categorical counsel mandate disserves the interests of low
and moderate income children, as described in Section II.A.1, because its
practical result is the dismissal of their claims. Courts would not tolerate
this outcome for adults. Important state interests support permitting
children’s claims to proceed,184 and dismissal is far from the least
restrictive alternative available to courts seeking to protect children’s
interests in litigation.185
B. Parents’ Rights and Responsibilities for Children
The counsel mandate also undermines the constitutional protections
accorded to parental decision-making. Courts addressing the counsel
mandate tend not to view parents advancing children’s claims as parents
at all. Instead, courts describe parents as acting as an attorney for their
children.186 Placing parents in the box of “wanna-be attorney” for child
litigants allows courts to frame the counsel mandate as simply a matter
of courtroom procedure and ignore its implications upon parental
authority. Viewing parent litigants instead as acting as parents protecting
the interests of their children through the courts reframes the decision of
whether to retain counsel as a parenting choice. This perspective, in turn,
invites consideration of the extent to which constitutional protections
183. The existence of exceptions to statutes of limitations that might toll claims during
minority does not avoid the problem of children’s claims expiring because exceptions do not
always apply and, even if applicable, are not always granted. See Gallo v. United States, 331 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 448 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“Dismissal would be a particularly harsh result in this case
because any subsequent claim filed by M.G. after dismissal of this action would be effectively
barred by the statute of limitations. Infancy does not toll the statute of limitations under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Therefore, M.G. would not be able to litigate her claim on her own behalf when
she reaches adulthood.” (citation omitted)).
184. See infra Section II.C.
185. See infra Part III.
186. See, e.g., Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 60–61 (2d
Cir. 1990); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 877, 879 (3d Cir. 1991).

866

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

shielding child-rearing from government interference extend to litigation
choices made by parents on behalf of children, including the choice of
whether to retain counsel. Arguably, parents facilitate children’s legal
rights through the exercise of their parenting authority.
1. Constitutional Protections for Parental Decision-Making
Parents have protected liberty interests in the care, custody, and
control of their children, which includes responsibility for decisionmaking about children’s well-being.187 This Part considers how the
Constitution’s protections for parenting impact the counsel mandate—a
doctrinal limitation that courts have so far ignored.
a. History and Purpose
Although the Constitution nowhere mentions parents or children,
parents’ freedom to raise their children has become regarded “as among
the most protected and cherished of all constitutional rights.”188 The Due
Process Clause creates a sphere of family privacy, which protects
spouses, parents and children, and close family members from
government interference in their relationships with one another.189 This
guarantee of privacy conveys to parents the fundamental liberty interest
in the “care, custody, and control of their children.”190 The Supreme
Court identified this liberty interest as “perhaps the oldest of the
187. See infra Section II.B.1.a.
188. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 177, at 23.
189. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“A
host of [Supreme Court] cases . . . have consistently acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.’” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944))); see
also The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1213–16 (discussing that the state cannot
generally intervene in a parent’s childbearing and child-rearing decisions).
190. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting that there is a “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our
jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with
broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that
course . . . .”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous
occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.’” (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949))).
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fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”191 Although
cases addressing parental rights typically address state government action
under the Fourteenth Amendment, these protections also constrain the
federal government under the Fifth Amendment.192
Parental caretaking rights are deeply rooted in tradition193 and support
several important interests. First, according parents the liberty to raise
their children as they see fit serves children’s interests in having those
who care most about them and know them best make important decisions
on their behalf.194 Parents are presumed to possess the “maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment” that children often lack, which is
necessary to make “life’s difficult decisions.”195 Parents also are
presumed to be motivated to act in their children’s best interests because
of the “natural bonds of affection” they share.196 As compared to other
adults or the state, parents are in the best position to make good choices
for their children because parents have intimate knowledge of their
children’s personalities, needs, and wishes.197
Second, protecting parental freedom in child-rearing serves parents’
interests in “achieving fulfillment through childrearing.”198 This interest
includes “[i]mparting values and beliefs to one’s children, responding to
their constantly changing demands, [and] ensuring that they will realize
their full potential as they grow into adulthood.”199
Finally, parental liberty interests advance society’s interest in
maintaining a diverse and pluralistic community.200 As government exists
in service of the people, rather than the people existing in service of the
191. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
192. See The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1187.
193. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401,
2406–08 (1995) (tracing the history of respect for parental authority throughout U.S. history).
194. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 177, at 46 (“[T]he core of the parental rights doctrine
guarantees children at least that the important decisions in their lives will be made by those who
are most likely to know them best and to care the most for them.”); The Constitution and the
Family, supra note 179, at 1350, 1353–54; E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the “Creatures of the
State”: Contracting for Child Custody Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1206–09 (2000).
195. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (“The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for
making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”).
196. Id. Professor Martin Guggenheim points out that this conclusion has not been subjected
to rigorous empirical study. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 177, at 35.
197. See Spitko, supra note 194; The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1350,
1353–54.
198. The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1353.
199. Id.
200. See id.; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
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government, parents have “[t]he duty to prepare the child for ‘additional
obligations,’” including “the inculcation of moral standards, religious
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”201 Because of the diversity in
their own morals and values, parents impart diverse morals and values to
their children in the course of child-rearing. Vesting the obligation to
prepare children for adulthood and full participation in political life with
parents prevents children from becoming “mere creature[s] of the
[s]tate,” indoctrinated with state-determined values and uniformity of
thought.202
The constitutional doctrine protecting parental liberty interests thus
creates a sphere of decision-making that reserves to parents the authority
to raise their children in accordance with their own morals and values.203
The doctrine establishes “why parents, as opposed to others, have rights
in and to their children,” and develops the contours of parents’ rights.204
The Supreme Court has recognized parents’ rights to “establish a home
and bring up children,”205 retain physical custody of their children,206 and
make decisions about children’s visitation with non-parents,207 religious
upbringing,208 education,209 and health.210
Nonetheless, parental authority is not absolute.211 It is constrained by
powers reserved to the government, including the police power, which
201. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535).
202. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; see also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 177, at 27 (“Our future as a
democracy depends on nurturing diversity of minds. The legal system’s insistence on private
ordering of familial life ultimately guards against state control of its citizens. Accordingly,
government must allow parents wide latitude to raise children as the parents wish to raise them.”
(footnote omitted)).
203. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 177, at 38 (“Any alternative to the parental rights doctrine
empowers state officials to meddle in family affairs and base their decisions on their own
values.”).
204. Id. at 18.
205. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
206. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
207. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (2000).
208. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1972).
209. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (finding parental liberty to
direct upbringing and education of children encompasses the choice to send child to private school
and precludes the state from outlawing non-public schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (finding that
the restriction of school curricula to prohibit the teaching of “modern” languages other than
English before the eighth grade unconstitutionally infringed on parents’ liberty interest in
controlling “the education of their own”).
210. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 588 & n.3, 604, 620–21 (1979) (upholding Georgia’s
mental hospital commitment statute, which permitted parents or guardians to request that their
child be committed if there was evidence of mental illness, because parental decisions regarding
a child’s medical care should receive great deference).
211. See The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1350, 1354 (“Although the
interests of parents themselves support parental control in all contexts, the interests of the child
and of society at large in parental control vary significantly. Parental rights therefore deserve
different degrees of constitutional protection in different circumstances.”).
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authorizes the state to regulate conduct that could harm all citizens,212 and
the parens patriae power, which authorizes the state to protect children
and vulnerable adults who are unable to look out for themselves.213
Finally, parental authority is limited by the constitutional rights of
children themselves.214
b. Legal Standard
Substantive due process analysis involves a “flexible balancing”
approach, in which courts weigh the nature of a government infringement
upon a fundamental right against the impact of the infringement upon the
right involved.215 The more intrusive the infringement, the more
substantial government interests must be to justify it, and the closer the
fit between those interests and the means used to advance them.216
The Court has articulated different formulations of this balancing
when evaluating government intrusions upon family life. Taken together,
Supreme Court doctrine suggests that courts should apply some form of
heightened scrutiny to government intrusions that directly interfere with
child-rearing decisions made by fit parents.217 In doing so, courts must
presume that fit parents’ choices serve children’s interests.218 “The Due
Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental
212. See Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991). See generally Santiago
Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007) (tracing
the history of police power to find it is defined by public safety).
213. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See
generally Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First
Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381
(2000) (detailing the history of state as guardian to children without private caretakers).
214. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights.”); The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1350, 1377–
83. See generally Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1
(exploring what rights the Constitution, and more specifically the Bill of Rights, grants to minors).
215. The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1193–96.
216. Id.
217. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that
when reviewing laws intruding on family living arrangements, “this Court must examine carefully
the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by
the challenged regulation”); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69 (plurality opinion) (applying heightened
scrutiny and holding courts must accord “special weight” to a parent’s decision regarding
visitation of children with third parties, but neither specifying the standard nor clarifying whether
the framework extended to other contexts).
218. Troxel, supra note 217, at 68. Thus, “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” Id. at 68–69.
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right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”219 Interventions that
override those choices should be sustained only if the parental decisions
at issue significantly harm a child and the intervention would actually
benefit the child. 220
2. The Scope of Parental Authority Over Children’s Legal Rights
Although parents’ rights to the care, custody, and control of children
are strongly rooted in constitutional and common law doctrine, parents’
authority with regard to children’s legal rights is evolving. Common law
doctrine historically limited the rights of parents as natural guardians to
those of care, custody, and control.221 Authority over children’s property
historically was reserved to court-appointed “guardians of the estate.”222
As legal claims are a type of property interest, parents likewise
traditionally lacked the authority to waive or release legal claims on
behalf of their children without court authorization.223 Today, state laws
vary with regard to whether and under what circumstances parents have
authority over the property of a child.224 In some states, parents have no
authority over a child’s property unless they are court-appointed to serve
as guardians of the child’s estate.225 Others grant parents authority over a
child’s estate or a child’s legal claims.226 Similarly, courts vary widely in
their understanding of how parents fit into the representatives authorized
219. Id. at 72–73.
220. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (rejecting the argument that the parens
patriae power permitted the state to override the religious beliefs of Amish parents and force
Amish children to attend school beyond eighth grade because the case was “not one in which any
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare
has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred” and noting “[t]he record is to the contrary,
and any reliance on that theory would find no support in the evidence” (footnote omitted)); see
The Constitution and the Family, supra note 179, at 1236–37.
221. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, §
9.4 at 331 & n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dower, 271 N.W. 193
(1937) (stating that a parent as such has no right to sell or encumber the child’s property)).
222. Id. at 310. This divergence between parents’ rights to care and custody and rights to
children’s property stems from feudal traditions and the early exercise of the king’s parens patriae
authority in England, which was undertaken primarily as a source of revenue for the crown. See
infra notes 260–61.
223. See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 707 F.2d 189, 194–95 (5th Cir. 1983).
224. Id. at 310. This divergence between parents’ rights to care and custody and rights to
children’s property stems from feudal traditions and the early exercise of the king’s parens patriae
authority in England, which was undertaken primarily as a source of revenue for the crown. See
infra notes 260–61.
225. See CLARK, supra note 221, at 557 n.11.
226. See, e.g., Irby v. Dowdy, 213 S.W. 739 (Ark. 1919) (noting that under Arkansas law,
“the natural guardian shall have the custody and care of minor children and their estates”); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 1201 (an infant without a court appointed guardian of his property shall appear (in
court) by a parent with legal custody).
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to bring children’s claims under Rule 17(c), with some recognizing
parents as general guardians, and others as next friends or guardians ad
litem.227
Although parents may lack exclusive legal province over the litigation
and resolution of children’s civil claims, as a practical matter, they are
the adults most likely to advance them.228 Given their familiarity with and
proximity to their children, parents are best situated to recognize that their
children have suffered wrongs and most likely to be motivated to pursue
legal action on their behalf.229 Children with living parents are unlikely
to have appointed guardians or conservators. And courts often look to
parents as the adult best suited for appointment as next friend or guardian
ad litem.230
Court preference for parents as next friends is consistent with court
deference to parents in other important decision-making spheres, as the
choice to initiate litigation for a child has a caretaking component.231
227. A full exploration of the questions of how parents fit under Rule 17(c) and whether
parents should be accorded priority in representing their children’s litigation interests is beyond
the scope of this Article. I explore these questions in a forthcoming article. Compare Croce v.
Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980) (mother entitled to bring suit as legal
guardian); Communities for Equity v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1001,
1006 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (“A parent is a guardian who may so sue” as a general guardian under
Federal Rule 17(c)) with Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1185 (S.D.
Fla.), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Typically, the next
friend who sues on behalf of a minor is that minor's parent.”); C.M.J. by & through D.L.J. v. Walt
Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc., No. 614CV1898ORL22GJK, 2017 WL 3065111, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. July 19, 2017) (“A parent bringing a personal injury claim as next friend on behalf of a child
acts as a de facto guardian ad litem, and is not the real party in interest insofar as the child’s
claims; the child is the real party in interest.”).
228. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44
(1977) (“[C]hildren usually lack the capacity to make [decisions about their interests;] . . . their
interest is ordinarily represented in litigation by parents or guardians.”).
229. See Maldonado ex rel. Maldonado v. Apfel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 296, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“[A] minor child living in a low-income family usually cannot exercise that right [to judicial
review of final decisions of the SSA] except through a parent or guardian.”).
230. See Bank of U.S. v. Ritchie, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 128, 144 (1834) (“[Infants] defend by
guardian to be appointed by the court, who is usually the nearest relation not concerned, in point
of interest, in the matter in question.”); see also Johnson v. Collins, 5 F. App’x 479, 485 (7th Cir.
2001) (“To maintain a suit in a federal court, a child or mental incompetent must be represented
by a competent adult, ordinarily a parent or relative.”); Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United
States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196–97 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“When a parent ‘brings an action on
behalf of a child, and it is evident that the interests of each are the same, no need exists for
someone other than the parent to represent the child’s interests . . . .’” (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno,
86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1183 (S.D. Fla.), aff’d, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000))).
231. A full exploration of the extent to which courts can interfere with parental authority by
appointing guardians ad litem or other representatives to make decisions for children in litigation
over parental objection where the interests of parents and children align is beyond the scope of
this Article, and is the subject of a forthcoming project. Interestingly, at least one court has held
that the retention of counsel by a parent, and the resulting obligation to pay legal fees, created a
conflict of interest that disqualified the parent from continuing to serve as a child’s representative
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Litigation has the potential to deplete multiple family resources,
including time, emotional energy, and money, which could otherwise be
used to meet a child’s other needs. Parents, like other potential litigants,
are likely to see courts as fora of last resort for resolving their children’s
disputes.232 A parent’s choice to initiate a child’s case can be understood
as a decision that filing suit is the best option to protect the child’s
interests.
Finally, the advancement of children’s legal claims by parents serves
an expressive function that conveys messages about values and
citizenship. When parents initiate lawsuits to vindicate their children’s
legal interests, they impart values to children about addressing disputes,
standing up for one’s self, using democratic institutions, and, potentially,
making the world a better place. Bringing suit can thereby be understood
as a statement of a parent’s values, as well as a signal that a parent
understands a child to have been wronged and a demonstration that a
parent is standing up for a child. A parent’s initiation of a lawsuit also has
an educational function, as it teaches children about the democratic
process, the rule of law, and resolving disputes through courts rather than
force.
In sum, although children enjoy independent legal rights and parents
do not have absolute legal authority over the exercise of those rights, it is
generally parents who facilitate those rights and thus give them force and
effect as a practical matter. These realities suggest that there is value in
the context of parent-child claims to understanding the choice to retain
counsel (or proceed pro se) not only as a litigation decision, but also as a
parenting choice—a calculation made by parents of how (or whether) to
allocate limited family resources to vindicate children’s legal interests.
Parents’ authority over children’s civil claims extends no further than that
of other civil litigants over their own cases. That is, parents are not
exempt from compliance with general procedural and evidentiary rules
just because they are acting on behalf of their children. The choice to
retain counsel stands apart from other litigation decisions because of its
implications for children’s ability to access the courts, children’s nonlegal needs, and parents’ transmittal of morals and values to children.
3. Why Deferring to Parents on the Question of Counsel Protects
Children’s Interests
Deferring to parents on the question of whether to retain counsel to
advance a child’s claim protects children’s interests. In extending the
counsel mandate to children’s claims, courts have generally concluded
that children should be treated like other parties unable to speak for
during settlement negotiations and required the appointment of a disinterested guardian ad litem.
See Scott v. District of Columbia, 197 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 2000).
232. See infra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
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themselves in litigation—largely, artificial entities such as corporations
and estates. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went so far
as to state that “[t]here is nothing in the guardian-minor relationship that
suggests that the minor’s interests would be furthered by representation
by the non-attorney guardian.”233 This may result from adherence to what
one commentator has dubbed the norm of “trans-personality”—the
principle that procedural rules should apply equally to all litigants,
without regard to the artificial entity type or personhood of the parties.234
But, where real differences exist, as between children and artificial
entities, the failure to account for those differences creates its own species
of unfairness.235 Several distinguishing features of the parent-child
relationship warrant treating parents and children differently than other
representational relationships in which the counsel mandate is applied,
such as corporate or testamentary cases.
The first and most important distinguishing feature of parent-child
relationship is humanity. Unlike other representational relationships to
which courts have applied the counsel mandate, the represented party in
the parent-child relationship (the child) is a human being. The particular
emotional attachments between parents and children represent a second
distinguishing feature of the relationship. Strong bonds of love and
affection, as well as a sense of moral obligation, motivate parents to do
right by their children.236 Finally, the interests of parents and children are
thoroughly intertwined.237 Because many decisions that parents make for
children also affect parents’ lives, parents are extra motivated to advance
their children’s interests.238
Furthermore, many concerns underlying the traditional rule against
representation by nonlawyers are inapplicable to parent-child claims.239
Court goals to protect the public and the administration of justice against

233. Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990).
234. Michalski, supra note 95, at 325.
235. Professor Roger Michalski argues that courts should depart from strict adherence to
trans-personality when doing so advances procedural values, including equalizing access or
litigation opportunities. Id. at 355–57 (“Strict formalism . . . conflicts with intuitions that there
might be good reasons to extend special protections to vulnerable persons and entities.”). For
further discussion of important differences between the child/parent relationship and other
representational relationships, see supra Section II.B.3.
236. See supra notes 193–97.
237. Courts have cited the blending of parents and children’s interests as one factor
supporting the exemption of SSI cases from the counsel mandate. See, e.g., Machadio v. Apfel,
276 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2002).
238. See Scott & Scott, supra note 193, at 2437.
239. See supra Section I.B.1.a. See generally Denckla, supra note 63, at 2593–99 (discussing
the rationale behind the unauthorized practice of law doctrine).
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unscrupulous conduct,240 for example, are not undermined by permitting
individual parents to advance individual claims on behalf of their own
children. Such parents do not seek to serve the public as a whole, and the
strong bonds and intertwined interests that parents share with their
children differentiate parents from nonlawyers seeking to represent
litigants for financial gain. Moreover, courts’ inherent powers authorize
courts to sanction nonlawyers and lawyers alike “for unethical tactics or
lack of candor.”241 Finally, although concerns about the competence of
nonlawyer parents to advance a child’s claims have merit, they disregard
the reality faced by low-income families. Where parents lack sufficient
financial resources to retain counsel on behalf of their children, such
children are unlikely to be able to afford to retain counsel themselves
once they reach adulthood.242 Thus, when courts evaluate the risk that a
nonlawyer parent’s incompetence might harm the child’s legal claim,
courts should not assess the parent against a lawyer, but rather against the
relative competence the child is likely to have as an eighteen-year-old
nonlawyer to advance the claim him or herself. If nothing else, parents’
increased life experiences are likely to make them more competent to
represent their children’s interests than the children themselves would be
at the cusp of adulthood.
Finally, reserving to parents the question of whether to retain counsel
serves the broader societal interests in cultivating diversity and pluralistic
thought that underlie constitutional protections for parental authority
generally. Eliminating the counsel mandate will enable far more parents,
with a far broader range of financial resources, to bring civil suits on
behalf of their children. As filing suit is about expression as well as
remedy, enabling families to make use of courts according to their values
and priorities, rather than according to their financial resources, facilitates
the public exchange of a broader range of ideas. Likewise, ensuring that
parents from all income levels are able to advance their children’s claims
guarantees that laws will be enforced and challenged to advance a broader
range of values and perspectives, and that courts will have an opportunity
to interpret and enforce laws in a broader array of contexts, not just those
of families with significant financial resources.

240. See Denckla, supra note 63, at 2594 (“[L]awyers are more likely to protect client
interests than nonlawyers . . . . [This] assumption is backed by the belief that lawyers are both
more competent and more scrupulous than nonlawyers would be in handling legal matters.”).
241. Id. at 2597.
242. See Jason DeParle, Harder for Americans to Rise from Lower Rungs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
4, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/harder-for-americans-to-rise-from-lowerrungs.html?sq=mobility&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/5L4C-UMWY].

2019]

NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL, NO ACCESS WITHOUT

875

C. Democratic Norms and Functions
The counsel mandate not only runs counter to established legal
doctrine, but also to fundamental norms and functions of democratic
government. Democracies are characterized not just by their formal
governing structures, but also by the informal norms or values that those
structures advance.243 Government actions that contravene fundamental
democratic values undermine the public trust and call into question the
legitimacy of the government itself.244 Democracies must be perceived as
legitimate to function because they operate by and for the people, and
thus depend on the consent of the people to govern.245
Fairness is a core democratic value that directly implicates public
acceptance of the government.246 People expect that the government will
treat them fairly both under the rule of law and also in its
implementation.247 Equality is a central component of the fairness people
expect from democracy.248 Political theorist Sidney Verba argues that an
important facet of this equality is having an equal political voice.249
“Perceived inequalities of voice challenge the legitimacy of the
government, reducing consent and requiring, perhaps, a more coercive
government.”250 Citizens exercise political voice through all forms of
political expression, including petitioning, and efforts to shape the law.251
The counsel mandate undermines these values by depriving poor
children of an equal political voice. The mandate silences the multiple
forms of political expression facilitated by litigation, including
communication to the government, the opposing party, and the broader
populace that a child has been wronged. The mandate also deprives poor
children of the opportunity to shape the law through the expression of

243. See Julia Azari, Forget Norms. Our Democracy Depends on Values, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT
(May 24, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/forget-norms-our-democracydepends-on-values/ [https://perma.cc/G82Q-764S]. Professor Robert Post argues that democracy
is best understood as “a normative idea that refers to substantive political values.” Robert Post,
Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 24, 25 (2006).
244. See Azari, supra note 243 (discussing the role of norms in maintaining legitimacy in
the executive branch).
245. See Sidney Verba, Fairness, Equality, and Democracy: Three Big Words, 73 SOC. RES.
499, 499–500 (2006).
246. See id.
247. See id. at 504–05.
248. See id.
249. Id.; see also SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (1995) (“Voice and equality are central to democratic participation. . . .
Since Democracy implies not only governmental responsiveness to citizen interests but also equal
consideration of the interests of each citizen, democratic participation must also be equal.”).
250. Verba, supra note 245, at 505.
251. Id. at 507.
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their perspective and needs.252 Court imposition of the mandate has the
potential not only to corrode the faith in government held by the children
and parents at issue, but also that of the broader populace. At a time when
the American public increasingly believes that courts favor the
wealthy,253 the wholesale exclusion of indigent children from federal
courts based on their poverty can only exacerbate that impression.
The counsel mandate not only undermines democratic norms, but also
the effective functions of democratic government. The exclusion of
indigent children’s claims limits courts’ ability to fully exercise the
judicial function, as courts deprive themselves of the opportunity to
interpret the law in the context of poor children’s concerns.254 This
deprivation may cause the law to bend toward the needs and interests of
adults and children from wealthier families and reduce the enforcement
level of regulatory regimes of particular utility for low-income
children.255
Moreover, foreclosing litigation on behalf of indigent children
prevents government accountability for harms done to this vulnerable
group, which is unable to express its discontent at the ballot box. The
exclusion of poor children’s claims further deprives the government and
the public of awareness of harms wrought by private actors, and may
leave children and their families with no tool but force to resolve disputes.
The perceived unfairness of children’s exclusion from federal civil
litigation may be further amplified by its disconnect with state policies.
Some states, for example, permit parents to represent their children pro
se and waive children’s constitutional right to appointed counsel in

252. See id. at 505–06 (“Democracy is a system by which citizens, ultimately, control
governmental decisions. It is also a system whose basic principle includes equal consideration of
the needs and preferences of all citizens. Equal political voice is the key to equal consideration. It
is through political activity that citizens convey to the government their needs and their
preferences. And equal political activity—equal voice in the processes of politics—makes it more
likely that government policies will provide equally beneficial output to citizens.”); see also
Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 233 (“The legal system, therefore, is not providing the review of
lower court proceedings which is essential for the development of justice and uniformity in the
law. Consequently, in addition to the possibility of injustice in the particular case, the lack of
corrective devices for a large number of cases involving the poor again shows the poor being
treated unequally as a class.”).
253. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and
Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 900 (2007) (“62% of the public say that
courts favor the wealthy or those with political influence . . . .”).
254. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (“Interpretation of the law and the Constitution is
the primary mission of the judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to resolve a
case or controversy.”).
255. Courts have cited this concern as further support for excepting SSI cases from the
counsel mandate. See supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text.
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juvenile proceedings that place their physical liberty at stake.256 The
disconnect between these doctrines gives rise to suspicion that the
common thread is not protecting children’s interests in court proceedings,
but costs.
III. PROTECTING CHILD LITIGANTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION
A. Reconceptualizing Federal Courts’ Role in Protecting
Child Litigants
Federal courts are charged with protecting child litigants, and courts
have broad discretion to determine what is required to protect a child
within the circumstances of a case.257 But the scope of courts’ protective
role often is overstated and court instincts are often overly interventionist.
Federal courts historically have declared themselves vested with a
duty to protect the interests of child litigants in the matters before them.258
As the Supreme Court noted in 1834, “[I]n all suits brought against
infants, whom the law supposes to be incapable of understanding and
managing their own affairs, the duty of watching over their interests
devolves, in a considerable degree, upon the court.”259 This duty to
protect children likely derives from the common law doctrine of parens
patriae, traditionally, “the King’s power as guardian of persons under
legal disabilities to act for themselves.”260 Federal courts continue to
describe this duty in strong terms, sometimes referring to children as the
“wards” of courts before whom their legal rights are presented,261 and
256. See, e.g., Huff v. K.P., 302 N.W.2d 779, 779, 783 (N.D. 1981) (finding that a father of
an eleven-year-old may waive child’s right to counsel and appear for her “albeit rather
ineffectively”).
257. See Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We hold
only that the district court’s primary concern in the instant case must be to assure, under Rule
17(c), that Daniel’s interests in vindicating his statutory and constitutional rights are properly
protected.”).
258. See, e.g., Coulson v. Walton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 62, 84 (1835) (“It is the duty of the court
to protect the interests of minors . . . .”).
259. Bank of U.S. v. Ritchie, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 128, 144 (1834).
260. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (“The concept of parens
patriae is derived from the English constitutional system. As the system developed from its feudal
beginnings, the King retained certain duties and powers, which were referred to as the ‘royal
prerogative.’ . . . Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the King’s power as guardian of
persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves. For example, Blackstone refers to the
sovereign or his representative as ‘the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics’ . . . .”
(footnote omitted) (first quoting Michael Malina & Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits
for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 NW. U. L. REV. 193, 197 (1970); and then
quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *47)); see also
Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The state regarded as a sovereign;
the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves . . . .”).
261. See, e.g., Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (“The court has a duty to enforce the Cheung rule sua sponte, for ‘[t]he infant is always
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with some portraying the court as the “true” guardian of children.262
Further to this end, federal courts continue to assert the traditional
prerogative to review and approve (or reject) proposed settlements of
children’s claims.263
Despite the sweeping rhetoric, federal courts’ protective role towards
children is limited by several doctrines. First, it is limited by federalism.
The parens patriae doctrine in the United States derives from the powers
of the English Court of Chancery.264 All of the Court of Chancery’s
powers, including the parens patriae power, devolved to the states and
not to the federal government.265 Reflecting this evolution, the domestic
the ward of every court wherein his right or property are brought into jeopardy, and is entitled to
the most jealous care that no injustice be done to him.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Johns v.
Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997))), abrogated in part by Winkelman ex rel.
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); duPont v. S. Nat’l Bank of Hous., 771
F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he infant is always the ward of every court wherein his rights
or property are brought into jeopardy, and is entitled to the most jealous care that no injustice be
done to him.” (quoting Richardson v. Tyson, 86 N.W. 250, 251 (Wis. 1901))). The description of
children as “wards” of the court may stem from the feudal tenurial system of England, under
which the lord or the crown assumed wardship of the children of a knight tenant if the tenant died
before the children reached adulthood. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 195–96 (1978). With the demise of the feudal system,
wardship became understood within English common law as a facet of the king’s power as parens
patriae (parent of the country) to protect persons unable to protect themselves, including children.
Id. at 201–02. At the outset, the English Court of Chancery exercised the king’s parens patriae
authority over the property of minor heirs as a source of revenue for the crown; the authority later
expanded to include humanitarian concerns. Id. at 199, 202; see also In re S.G., 677 N.E.2d 920,
928 (Ill. 1997) (discussing that the parens patriae doctine’s history is derived from English
courts); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 117–18 (W. Va. 1974) (discussing that
the early development of the doctrine of parens patriae is derived from English law as a state
fiscal policy).
262. See, e.g., Anderson v. SAM Airlines, No. 94 Civ.1935(ERK), 1997 WL 1179955, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1997) (“Indeed, it is the judge who truly stands in a guardian/ward relationship
with the infant. ‘The guardian ad litem is appointed merely to aid and to enable the court to
perform that duty of protection.’” (citation omitted) (quoting duPont, 771 F.2d at 882)).
263. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 707 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Against this
background it is apparent that a minor’s rights may not be relinquished except pursuant to a
specific authorization from a court of competent jurisdiction. It is incumbent upon the court from
which the authority to compromise a minor’s claim is sought, and any court called upon to give
effect to that compromise, to take pains to assure that the minor’s interest is well served.”); Mock
v. Grady-White Boats, Inc., Nos. 11-2057, 11-2653, 2013 WL 1879683, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 17,
2013) (“Under federal law, it is well established that ‘[t]he court, whose duty it is to protect the
interests of the infant, should see to it that they are not bargained away by those assuming . . . to
represent him.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Torres v. Trinity Indus. Inc.,
229 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2002))), adopted by Nos. CIV.A. 11-2057, 11-2653, 2013
WL 1879681 (E.D. La. May 3, 2013).
264. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Domestic Relations Law: Federal Jurisdiction and State
Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14–15, 14 nn.63–64 (1984).
265. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (“In the United States,
the ‘royal prerogative’ and the ‘parens patriae’ function of the King passed to the States.”);
Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (1 How.) 369, 384 (1855) (“[W]hen this country achieved its
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relations exception to federal jurisdiction reserves most questions of
children’s welfare to the states.266 And even the states’ parens patriae
authority is limited by the constitutional rights of parents to the care,
custody, and control of their children, and by children’s constitutional
rights.267
In light of these constraints on federal power, federal courts’ duty to
protect children can be understood to concern child litigants’ interests in
the litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide insight into
the scope of federal courts’ protective role. Rule 17(c) requires courts to
“appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to
protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an
action.”268 Likewise, Rule 55(b) requires the court, rather than the court
clerk, to review a request for entry of default against a child party and
precludes the court from entering a default judgment against a child
litigant who lacks an adult representative in the case.269 Both of these
rules obligate courts to ensure that child litigants have appropriate legal
representatives, or that children’s interests are adequately protected
without an adult representative. These rules give courts significant
flexibility in exercising their responsibilities to child litigants. Courts
must affirmatively assess whether children’s interests are protected, but
they retain discretion to determine what, if anything, is needed to protect

independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. . . . The State,
as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. . . . Powers not judicial, exercised by the chancellor merely
as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king’s prerogative as parens patriae,
are not possessed by the circuit courts.”); see also id. at 393 (Taney, C.J., concurring) (“The 2d
section of the 3d article of the [C]onstitution . . . obviously confer[s] judicial power, and nothing
more; and cannot, upon any fair construction, be held to embrace the prerogative powers, which
the king, as parens patriae, in England, exercised through the courts. And the chancery
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, as granted by the [C]onstitution, extends only to
cases over which the court of chancery had jurisdiction, in its judicial character as a court of
equity. The wide discretionary power which the chancellor of England exercises over infants . . .
has not been conferred. These prerogative powers . . . remain with the States.”); Rush, supra note
264, at 14–15, 14 n.64 (“It has been argued that the nonjudicial prerogatives of the crown, such
as the parens patriae doctrine, devolved upon the sovereign states and not upon the federal
government.”).
266. See Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
267. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000) (finding that the state cannot exercise
its parens patriae authority to override the judgment of fit parents regarding their children’s
visitation with non-parents); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (concluding that the state acting
as parens patriae in juvenile delinquency proceedings does not entitle it to deprive juveniles of
constitutional rights, including the due process right to notice and an opportunity to respond to
charges, the right to counsel, and the privilege against self-incrimination, among others).
268. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
269. Id. at 55(b)(1), (2); 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1570 (3d ed. 2018).
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a particular child in a particular case.270 The flexibility accorded by the
Rules contrasts strikingly with courts’ rigid formulation and application
of the counsel mandate.
Second, courts’ role in overseeing children’s litigation interests is
limited by parents’ and children’s constitutional rights.271 To date, courts
have ignored them. Courts have not considered the extent to which child
litigants’ constitutional rights or fit parents’ constitutionally protected
sphere of decision-making constrain the courts’ discretion to require
parents to retain counsel.272 Nor have courts made individualized
determinations about the impact of a parent proceeding pro se on the
interests of a particular child. Instead, courts’ analyses rely on the
assumption that legal representation best serves the interests of every
child. For several reasons, this unsupported assumption cannot continue
to justify the counsel mandate under heightened scrutiny.
First, the mandate does not result in poor children securing counsel.
Absent further court action, the mandate may simply result in the
dismissal of children’s claims.273 Indeed, even should a court want to
obtain counsel for a child litigant, it lacks the power definitively to do so.
Under federal law, courts only have the authority to request counsel to
represent indigent litigants in civil matters; courts have neither the power
to require counsel to do so, nor funds with which to pay attorneys who
agree to serve.274 Lacking both carrot and stick, these requests may go
unmet.275
Second, courts exceed the proper bounds of their authority by so
readily substituting their own judgments for those of parents without
giving parental decisions any consideration or weight. “Simply because
the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child, or because it involves
risks, does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision
from the parents to some agency or officer of the state.”276 Courts’ special
270. See M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1977).
271. See United States v. Maryans, 803 F. Supp. 1378, 1379 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (“[T]he court’s
authority under Rule 17(c) extends only as far as necessary to protect the incompetent’s interest.”).
272. Similar concerns have been raised about courts overriding parents’ and children’s
constitutional rights while ostensibly exercising their powers to protect children’s best interests,
for example, regarding the exercise of parens patriae authority to preclude parents from resolving
custody disputes through arbitration. See, e.g., Spitko, supra note 194, at 1154.
273. See, e.g., Stanford v. Brantley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70200, at *1–2 (M.D. Ala. 2008)
(dismissal for failure to appear by counsel).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2012).
275. See Mallard v. District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (court authority under 28 U.S.C.
1915 is limited to “requesting” uncompensated attorney service, not compelling it, but attorneys’
ethical obligations should weigh in favor of accepting court requests). The Supreme Court left
undecided in Mallard the question of whether courts had the inherent authority to compel
attorneys to serve without compensation.
276. Parham, supra note 31, at 602–03 (indeed, “[t]hat some parents ‘may at times be acting
against the interests of their children,’ . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to
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insight into litigation and how it is best pursued not only gives children’s
litigation interests outsized importance to courts, but also may feed the
perception that courts are in the best position to assess children’s interests
as litigants. Likewise, courts’ confidence in their perception of what is
best for children as litigants may cause courts to broadly conclude that
parents who take the risk of proceeding pro se have judged unwisely.
Yet, by focusing exclusively on the generalized litigation interests of
child litigants, courts overlook the many other interests significant to an
individual child, which may legitimately impact a parents’ decision to
retain counsel (or not). In deciding whether to bring a legal claim on a
child’s behalf, a parent necessarily will consider a child’s interests in
advancing the claim and how much the family can invest in the claim
within the context of other pressing interests in the child’s life, because
for parents, children’s legal and non-legal interests are inextricably
related by a shared pot of resources. Rather than conclude that parents
who bring children’s claims pro se have wantonly disregarded the
benefits of counsel, it is more reasonable to assume that the average
parent understands that a claim would be better presented with counsel
but has determined that the investment of the family’s financial resources
in legal fees is not the best choice overall for the child.
For some families, this investment may be simply impossible. 277
Parents living in poverty cannot be said to have a meaningful “choice” to
retain counsel for their children when doing so would require sacrificing
food, medical care, transportation, or putting the family’s housing at risk.
Additionally, parents may face structural barriers that impede their ability
to secure representation even in cases where fee-shifting provisions
provide a potential external source of attorney fee payment. 278 As with
parental decision-making in other contexts, judges are not well situated
to identify and evaluate the factors that parents consider as they weigh
whether they can and should invest family resources in the retention of
counsel.279
discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in
the child’s best interests”) (internal citations omitted).
277. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one
who has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin of
survival many of them are. A sudden illness, for example, may destroy whatever savings they
may have accumulated, and, by eliminating a sense of security, may destroy the incentive to save
in the future. A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a routine purchase, but a luxury
indulged in only rarely. The desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which the majority
seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They have more important things to do with what
little money they have . . . .”).
278. See supra notes 144–47.
279. See Spitko, supra note 194, at 1198 (“Parental autonomy is grounded also in the view
that the state generally functions poorly as a parent and, in most cases, would function less ably
than would a child’s biological or adoptive parents. Most parents know their child better and
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Third, generalized assumptions about the value of counsel cannot
justify the mandate because this perceived value is partly about the
functioning of courts themselves.280 Federal courts continue to operate
under a purely adversarial model, which functions as intended only when
all parties have legal representation.281 Without guaranteed governmentfunded legal assistance in civil as well as criminal matters, low-income
litigants will never achieve meaningful equal access rights, and some
might argue, based on how the right to counsel has been realized in
practice in the criminal justice system, not even then.282 The counsel
mandate places the responsibility to remedy this structural disconnect for
poor children upon poor children and their parents. But this delegation
does nothing to rectify the disconnect in fact because indigent litigants
cannot do what the mandate directs. It is incumbent upon the courts to
remedy structural choices that prevent individuals living in poverty from
fully realizing their rights in courts.
Finally, the mandate is based on assumptions regarding the value of
legal representation, which are not supported by empirical evidence. As
a result of an enduring reticence to study the efficacy of legal assistance,
today we are entirely without an empirical understanding of how and
under what circumstances legal assistance benefits litigants who
otherwise would proceed pro se.283 Courts also have not fully articulated
which interests of children legal representation is needed to protect. These
gaps are critical, because absent this information, courts cannot identify
the particular litigants, claims, or stages in litigation that would
meaningfully benefit from legal representation.284 Likewise, especially in
understand her particular needs and wishes better than the state is capable of doing. Moreover,
parents generally are better able than is the state to apply this knowledge for the benefit of their
child.”).
280. Rebecca Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DAEDELUS 49, 52 (2019) (arguing that lawyers
are not always the solution to access to justice problems, sometimes systemic reform is the better
approach).
281. See Fern A. Fisher, Why Judges Support Civil Legal Aid, 148 DAEDELUS 171, 171
(2019).
282. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and
Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 972 (2012).
283. See generally Rebecca L. Sandefur, Paying Down the Civil Justice Data Deficit:
Leveraging Existing National Data Collection, 68 S.C. L. REV. 295 (2017); D. James Greiner &
Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does
Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012) (concluding that all
but seven of over one hundred identified studies regarding the impact of counsel are unreliable
because they compare case outcomes without randomized controls).
284. D. James Greiner, The New Legal Empiricism & Its Application to Access-to-Justice
Inquiries, 148 DAEDELUS 64, 65 (2019) (“There is little evidence about how to identify cases in
which full representation makes a difference.”); Sandefur, supra note 280 (“Lawyers and social
scientists have a limited understanding of how to determine which justice problems of the public
need lawyers’ services and which do not.”).
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light of this gap, courts can neither categorically conclude that dismissal
better serves children’s interests than pro se litigation,285 nor predict what
level of legal assistance—full representation throughout the litigation, or
something less—would suffice.286 The benefits of counsel may be
particularly overvalued in the context of the claims of low-income
children, whose parents may simply abandon the claim entirely if ordered
to retain counsel, and in the context of practice areas in which there is a
dearth of counsel competent and willing to assist.287 And, despite the
many challenges faced by pro se litigants, parents have secured
successful outcomes for their children pro se.288
This discussion is not intended to disregard courts’ experience-based
appreciation for the value of legal assistance to litigants, generally, nor
the ideal that those living in poverty ought to enjoy equal access to legal
services. Judges are uniquely situated to appreciate the positive impact of
legal representation on litigation and the significant challenges faced by
pro se parties. Pro se litigants obtain far fewer favorable case outcomes
than do represented parties.289 Judges report that pro se litigants regularly
285. Some empirical studies suggest that in some settings, some litigants can successfully
represent themselves. More research is needed to understand why such litigants were successful
in those settings (characteristics of litigants, types of claims, characteristics of court). Jeffry
Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri, & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery, Resource Allocation,
and Access to Justice: Griener and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 45, 55, 59 (2012) (citing Greiner and Pattanayak, as well as Ralph C. Cavanaugh &
Deborah L. Rhode, Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976)).
286. Jeffry Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri, & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery,
Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Griener and Pattanayak and the Research
Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 55 (2012) (“without well-designed research to provide
objective and credible evaluation of our efforts, we have no basis to compare different fullrepresentation models with each other or with less-than-full representation or nonrepresentation
alternatives”).
287. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545–46 (2001) (stating that speech
restrictions imposed by Congress on Legal Services Corporation attorneys, which required
withdrawal if case raised constitutional questions, were especially problematic because indigent
clients pursuing welfare benefits appeals were “unlikely to find other counsel”); Maldonado ex
rel. Maldonado v. Apfel, 55 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognizing the challenge
posed by dearth of counsel for SSI appeals).
288. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir.
2002) (declining to overturn district court verdict for plaintiff on basis that plaintiff’s claim was
pursued by nonlawyer parent pro se and holding that a trial court’s failure to require an adult
representative to obtain counsel at trial is not reversible error).
289. See Carpenter, supra note 2, at 658 & n.33; David A. Hyman et al., Medical Malpractice
Litigation and the Market for Plaintiff-Side Representation: Evidence from Illinois, 13 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 603, 608, 610 (2016); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional
Expertise: Understanding Relational and Substantive Expertise through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM.
SOC. REV. 909, 910 (2015); Steinberg, supra note 2, at 756–57. In one study of filings in the
Southern District of New York, no pro se litigants who went to trial on their claims won a
judgment on the merits. Jonathon D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management
and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York,
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fail to present critical evidence, make significant procedural errors,
ineffectively question witnesses, and fail to object to opponents’
improprieties.290 And parents’ errors do harm children’s legal claims.291
All of this lends further contextualized support to the growing call for
empirical research to inform critical questions of legal “service delivery,
resource allocation, and access to justice.”292
For all of these reasons, courts’ role in protecting children’s interests
should be understood as primarily about ensuring that children have
appropriate adult representatives actively participating in the case. When
parents represent children’s interests in litigation, constitutional
principles suggest that courts should give parents’ decisions special
weight and not intervene just because courts believe a “better” decision
could be made. Especially in the context of the choice to retain counsel,
which impacts the availability of financial resources to meet children’s
other needs, courts should presume that parents act in children’s best
interests and defer to their judgment about whether counsel should be
retained. It is important that courts understand their protective role as an
exercise of discretion rather than one bound by absolutes. By applying
the counsel mandate as an absolute bar to the advancement of children’s
claims, courts do more harm than good, particularly for children living in
poverty.

30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 340 (2002). Likewise, a study of the Northern District of California
found that “[m]ore than half of the claims involving a pro se litigant were dismissed under a
preliminary motion such as a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim.” Spencer G. Park,
Note, Providing Equal Access to Equal Justice: A Statistical Study of Non-Prisoner Pro Se
Litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in San
Francisco, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 823 (1997).
290. See LINDA KLEIN, ABA COAL. FOR JUST., REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE
IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS 12 & tbl. 4 (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/abanews/1279030087coalition_for_ju
stice_report_on_survey.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZH7-KZJP]; DONNA STIENSTRA ET
AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT
ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES 23 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/2012/ProSeUSDC.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2V6-6PT5].
291. See, e.g., Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 886 (jury relied upon a faulty instruction and denied
children relief because their claims had expired, after father failed to timely object to faulty
instruction). A study of cases brought by parents to enforce children’s rights under the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA)—a context in which parents have independent standing
and thus are permitted to proceed pro se—found that parents seeking relief fare significantly worse
when they litigate their claims pro se. Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without
Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Educational Lawyering, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 113–14 (2011).
292. Jeffry Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri, & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery,
Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Griener and Pattanayak and the Research
Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 46 (2012).
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B. A Path Forward
Given the present reality of scarce resources and scarce empirical
data, how should courts proceed when presented with civil claims
brought by parents on behalf of children? First, courts should discard the
counsel mandate and exempt claims brought by parents on behalf of their
children from the general application of the rule that a nonlawyer cannot
represent the interests of another in litigation. Courts have the authority
to discard the rule not only because it contravenes constitutional rights,
but also because the choice to apply the rule (or not) is a matter wholly
within courts’ inherent discretion. Some courts already recognize that the
counsel mandate is not ironclad, warrants a contextual determination,293
and should not apply where clear injustice results.294 Courts are right to
recognize the harms the rule inflicts in these contexts, but injustice occurs
whenever poor children are categorically prevented from advancing their
claims.
Rather than dismissing children’s claims as a matter of course, courts
should permit claims brought by parents pro se on behalf of children to
proceed and fulfill their responsibility to assess whether additional
supports are needed to protect children’s interests. In doing so, courts
should consider whether efforts to secure counsel are warranted. Rule
17(c) gives courts broad discretion to take “any other actions necessary
to protect the interests” of litigants who lack legal capacity.295 This
authority arguably permits courts to appoint counsel whenever necessary
to protect a child litigant’s interests. The exercise of courts’ discretion
under Rule 17(c) may (but need not) be informed by court practice under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which authorizes courts to request counsel to
represent indigent civil litigants of any age and capacity. 296 Courts have
developed a set of specific criteria for evaluating litigant requests for
appointment of counsel under § 1915(e), including that: the litigant lacks
adequate financial resources, the case is likely “of substance,” the litigant
diligently has attempted to secure counsel, the complexity of legal issues,
the litigant’s ability to litigate the case, and any “special factors” that
make appointment of counsel more likely to result in a just
determination.297 Section 1915(e) authorizes courts to dismiss
293. Tindall, 414 F.3d at 285–86 (providing, “We pause to note, however, that the rule is not
quite as absolute as it may seem,” and “[i]n our view, the rule that a parent may not represent her
child should be applied gingerly.”).
294. See, e.g., Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2002).
295. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
296. See Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(appointing counsel for a severely disabled infant under § 1915).
297. Professor Catherine Ross argues that these factors support the routine appointment of
counsel in civil litigation implicating children’s interests, an argument that applies with greater
force where children are parties to the litigation. Ross, supra note 26, at 1596–98. Some courts
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proceedings in forma pauperis if the court determines the case to be
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Thus, like in any proceeding brought in forma pauperis, courts should
first assess whether the case is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim.298 Next, courts should evaluate the complexity of the case.299
Cases requiring fact development and the presentation of evidence at trial
may be more likely to benefit from the assistance of counsel than those
in which courts need only review a factual record developed at the agency
level.300 Likewise, cases raising novel issues of law or involving
ambiguous processes might signal a greater need for legal
representation.301 Courts might also prioritize cases involving
fundamental rights, disputes incapable of resolution outside of courts, and
claims expiring during a child’s minority.
To increase the likelihood that requests for attorney service will result
in representation, courts could partner with the private bar and legal
services organizations to recruit a cadre of lawyers ready to accept court
have expressed similar sentiments. See, e.g., Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d. Cir. 2002)
(“Certainly, where the district court harbors any doubt about the abilities of the non-attorney
parent in a matter involving a substantial claim, counsel should be appointed. Under the law,
children – society’s future – deserve no less.”).
298. Two former federal court pro se clerks note the challenges posed to screening pro se
civil complaints, including that they must be screened “solely on the basis of a single poorlydrawn set of allegations (unlike collateral attacks on conviction or interim rulings in criminal
cases, which are reviewed on the basis of records of judicial factfinding proceedings), and, “in
civil rights cases, the law is changing constantly.” As a result, they recommend that screening be
flexible, and summary dismissal reserved for cases in which the complaint clearly fails to establish
federal jurisdiction,” “contains some other incurable defect,” or the allegations are
incomprehensible. Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside
View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 211 (1972). See also
Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access
to Justice, 160 PENN. L. REV. 967 (2012) (appointment of counsel should be reserved for
meritorious claims). Courts should not use the frivolity test as a mechanism for dismissing all pro
se claims brought on behalf of minors. Epps v. Russell Cty. Dep’t of Human Res., No. 3:15CV25MHT, 2015 WL 1387950, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2015) (“Because it is futile for the Plaintiffs
to attempt to pursue claims pro se on their children’s behalf, all claims they purport to assert on
behalf of their children are frivolous and are due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).”).
299. Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed Counsel Funding and Pro
Se Access to Justice, 160 PENN. L. REV. 967 (2012); Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann,
The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
157, 206 (1972). Until more empirical research is completed, court judgments about the types of
“complexity” that most warrant legal assistance will have to continue to be based on intuition and
individual experience.
300. See supra note 78.
301. Jeffry Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri, & Stephen Wizner, Service Delivery,
Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Grien and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative,
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 52 (2012).
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requests to represent child litigants.302 Fee shifting under federal civil
rights statutes and courts’ Rule 17(c) authority could help persuade
lawyers to accept appointments.303
Separately, courts should evaluate what structural reforms are needed
to make judicial processes more accessible to and functional for pro se
parties, generally, as such measures could potentially enable nonlawyer
parents to better advance their children’s claims.304 Courts might rely on
magistrate judges to oversee fact-finding,305 establish pro se legal clinics
on site to offer limited legal advice and assistance with preparing court
forms and procedural questions, create standardized forms and
procedural manuals for pro se parties, and publish information about
court and judicial practices.306 Finally, courts should seek out and support
empirical research on the impact of structural changes on the accessibility
of courts for unrepresented parties, as many courts already do for adult
pro se litigants.
CONCLUSION
Court efforts to protect the interests of child litigants must account for
children’s and parents’ fundamental rights. The counsel mandate ignores
children’s right of access to the courts, and its blanket application
unjustifiably substitutes courts’ decisions for parents’ decisions about
302. See Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 n.1 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The provision of legal
counsel will depend on the continuing efforts, among others, of members of the relevant bar, legal
services organizations, law firm pro bono services, and the court. We are aware of some of the
stated impediments to the delivery of legal services in children’s SSI cases. . . . Mindful of such
problems, we do not believe that they should be permanent barriers to legal aid. Rather they should
be a spur to take steps to improve the effective administration of justice.”). The court identified
impediments to the availability of legal services in children’s SSI cases, noting that “potential
contingent fees are small and attorneys ‘cannot be assured payment because the SSA does not
automatically withhold a portion of a successful claimant’s retroactive benefits for attorney’s
fees.’” Id.
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012). Courts have assessed costs under Rule 17(c) to
compensate court-appointed guardians ad litem for their role in representing children’s interests
before the court. Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The fees of
attorneys appointed by courts to protect children’s interests should likewise be eligible for
compensation.
304. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 448 (2011).
305. Fern A. Fisher, Why Judges Support Civil Legal Aid, 148 DAEDELUS 171, 172 (2019)
(suggesting referral of cases to magistrates for fact finding as an alternative to demanding a fully
adversarial process to equalize access to justice in the absence of counsel for all); Donald H.
Zeigler and Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the
Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 211–12 (1972) (arguing that appointment of counsel is
the only way to assure pro se civil litigants “substantial justice,” except for “establishing special
courts staffed by ‘investigator-judges’” and developing and implementing radically revised court
procedures).
306. See generally the measures taken by the Eastern District of New York.
https://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/self-representation [https://perma.cc/G6GN-MAKH]. See also
the measures taken by the Southern District of New York. http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/prose
[https://perma.cc/4VVV-64QH].
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what best serves children’s interests. The mandate’s resulting exclusion
of indigent children from federal courts violates not only the rights of the
parents and children involved, but also the democratic norms of fairness
and equality, and thereby breeds distrust for our system of justice. To
reconcile courts’ obligations to protect children with these competing
guarantees, courts should discard the counsel mandate. Instead, courts
should permit cases brought by unrepresented parents on behalf of
children to proceed, and liberally exercise their discretion to appoint
counsel to ensure children’s interests are protected. To fulfill their
obligation to protect children’s interests in such cases, courts should
consider appointment of counsel and institute reforms to make judicial
processes more accessible to all pro se litigants, including parents. Taking
steps to protect children’s interests as litigants, rather than dismissing
their claims, is a better, less constitutionally precarious way to protect
children’s interests, respect parents’ choices, and ensure children’s access
to justice.

